7th squadron

The JG-7 squadron became the most productive formation of all the units that have ever used the Me-262. In the seven months of its existence, more Me-262 fighters and jet pilots were sent to Jagdgeschwader-7 than to any other.

The squadron was formed in August 1944. It was planned that it would include two groups of FW 190s based in Koenigsberg. The lack of pilots and aircraft did not allow the plan to be fulfilled, so it was decided to arm both groups with Bf 109G-14 aircraft. Now the Siegenhain airfield in Czechoslovakia was determined as the base for the II group. However, the headquarters again faced a shortage of personnel and aircraft. The formation of a jagdgeschwader armed with Bf 109G-14 also remained only on paper.

Against the backdrop of all these troubles, Colonel Johannes Steinhoff received the appointment as squadron commander. Meanwhile, the plans of the Luftwaffe command regarding the squadron being formed have changed dramatically. According to the latest plan, not two, but three groups were to be included in the JG-7, and the jagdgeschwader staffs were to be armed with jet Me-262s. After the war, Steinhoff recalled the beginning of the formation of the world's first formation of jet fighters in the autumn of 1944:

The first planes have begun to arrive. They were brought in large railway containers, disassembled into parts. Our mechanics, together with representatives of the Messerschmitt company, assembled fighters and tested their weapons. At the end of November, we were already flying, practicing flights as part of a pair and a trio.

After six weeks of training flights in the Brandenburg-Brest area, Steinhoff reported that the squadron had reached a state of combat readiness. New aircraft, problems with the supply of specific spare parts, the arrival of new pilots - all this prevented Steinhoff from putting together a truly soldered combat team. Weak tactical interaction remained the squadron's Achilles' heel until the end of the war.

The first combat-ready group of the squadron was III / JG 7 under the command of Major Erich Hohagen, which was transferred to Parchim near Schwerin. The nucleus of III./JG-7 was Commando Novotny. The III./JG-7 pilots were given the task of developing tactics combat use Me-262 for the remaining groups of the 7th squadron. Proposed methods of exploiting the advantages of jet fighters in attacking four-engined bombers have sparked a lively debate.

The formation date of III./JG-7 is November 19, 1944. Pilots in III./JG-7 were selected from Kommando Novotny, JG-54, JG-3 Udet and KG-1 Hindenburg. The base of the group was determined by the Lager-Lakfeld airfield. Steinhoff recalled the discussions regarding the tactics of combat use and the place of the Me-262 in the Reich defense system against Allied bomber raids:

- We have developed several methods for the best use of the Me-262 against the formation of bombers, but have not come to a consensus. In the end, we returned to the recognition of the old well-known tactics: attacking from behind from above, flying through the barrage of gunners and opening fire with airborne weapons from extremely close range. The Me-262 was a strict pilot and a very vulnerable aircraft, our losses were higher than we expected.

In the second week of November, a group of JG-7 officers arrived at the Lager-Leckfeld airfield, located in the heart of Bavaria. The personnel of the squadron were very experienced, most of them flew piston fighters for several years, and at least 70% of the pilots, according to the memoirs of Hermann Büschner, who served in JG-7, were aces. Experienced fighters were eager to try out new fighters in combat. The wait dragged on. At the first sign of a raid by enemy bombers, the Me-262s were rolled into caponiers disguised by trees, and the pilots hurried into trenches dug nearby. The situation did nothing to boost morale. Part of the pilots, led by Rudy Zinner, agreed to keep a "shwarm" - a link of four aircraft - in readiness for an immediate departure. "Schwarm" was supposed to rise to intercept as soon as enemy aircraft were detected.

The first sortie took place on 28 November. Major Zinner was the leader of the Schwarma (Schwarmführer), the leader of the second pair (Rottenführer) was Oberfeldwebel Büschner. Here is how Bushner himself described that historic flight:

“The weather was by no means perfect when at 11.15 we received the command to take off. The engines of my Me-262 started the first time, while the pilots of the other three fighters could not start the engines of their planes in any way. I decided to take off. After cleaning the supports chassis, I carefully checked the instrument readings, paying special attention to the temperature of the gases in the turbines, then tuned the FuG-14 radio station to the Bavaria channel (ground guidance operators worked on this channel): “Swallow - Bavaria, answer.” The answer came immediately - " Bayern" began to issue guidance commands. By this time, I had gained a height of about 5-6 thousand meters. "Swallow, fly on a course of 340 at an altitude of 7000 meters, the distance to the target is 20 km." An American intelligence officer was approaching Munich. I followed the instructions from the ground , once again checked the temperature of the gases and removed all four MK-108 guns from the fuses. "The target is in front of you, five, four, three, two, one, contact has been made" - meanwhile, I did not see the air Not a single enemy aircraft. The first contact was wrong. The flight had been going on for 15 minutes. New instructions came from the ground: "Heading 270 degrees." Over Augsburg, I encountered a cloud front, I had to dive under the clouds. The next command of the control operator: "Course 270. Reconnaissance aircraft, distance 70 km." I scored 8,000 meters and lay down on a given course, the flight lasted for more than 20 minutes, there was continuous cloud cover all around. The guidance station gave a reading of the range to the scout: "Ten kilometers, five, four, three, two." At a distance of two kilometers from the target, I slightly turned the fighter to the right and saw the enemy, it turned out to be a reconnaissance version of the Lightning. I "driven" him into the sight and opened fire, the first round passed above the scout, I had to slightly lower the nose of my aircraft. Now the 30-mm cannon shells hit the American, the flames enveloped the Lightning's starboard side, apparently, I hit the fuel tank. The scout rolled over the wing and went into a erratic fall. I reported the downing to the guidance station and requested a course to the airfield. From the ground, I was congratulated on the victory and recommended to lie down on a course of 90 degrees. Another check of instrument readings and, again, special attention to the temperature of the gases of both YuMO-004 and the fuel gauge. On the approaches to Lager-Lekfeld, the lower edge of the cloudiness dropped to only 500 m, and visibility decreased to 10-15 km. I kept a speed of 650 km / h and flew at an altitude of 600 m and jumped out of the clouds right above the airfield. During the landing approach, I dropped the speed of the turbines, reducing the speed to 250-300 km / h, and extended the flaps. Less than a minute later, the wheels of my Me-262 touched the strip of the Lager-Lekfeld airfield. The entire flight took 80 minutes, from 11:35 a.m. to 12:55 p.m.."

Me 262 from JG-7

On the same day, Major Rudy Zenner shot down another F-5 over Lake Ammir.

Despite the rapid activity of the pilots in the first weeks of the existence of the geschwader, III. / JG-7 still could not achieve a state of full combat readiness due to the lack of new aircraft, spare parts and a high accident rate (ten Me-262s crashed in six weeks due to technical malfunctions and errors in piloting technique). By the end of November, the situation was rectified by the joint efforts of Büschner and Zinner, but the disgusting weather, which lasted all three first weeks of December, again pushed back the commissioning of III./JG-7.

During this period, from a technical point of view, III./JG-7 was already ready to take part in the defense of Berlin from attacks by US Air Force heavy bombers. True, only one successful Me-262 flight to intercept enemy aircraft is known: on December 2, Lieutenant Jachim Weber shot down three English Mosquitos. Weber received the Iron Cross 1st Class for this flight, which Goering personally presented to him.

At the end of December, good weather set in, allowing the pilots of JG-7 to resume training flights at the same intensity, and success in sorties soon followed.

Lager-Lakfeld became a priority target for Allied photo reconnaissance and bombers starting in July 1944. On December 23, 1944, German fighters intercepted an F-5 reconnaissance aircraft from the 7th photo reconnaissance group, flying under the cover of Mustangs from the 353rd Fighter Air Group. Air battle broke out over Magdeburg. Oberfeldwebel Erich Buttner and Feldwebel Böckel shot down one P-51D each, however, according to the headquarters of the 353rd group, only one Mustang did not return from a combat mission that day. Buttner, who died on March 20, 1945, became one of the first "jet" aces, on his account there were at least eight shot down. Buttner won his first victories on October 28 and 29 (two P-47s and one P-51D). He became the first ace of JG-7, but not the first "jet" ace of the Luftwaffe; the very first was a native of the ZG-26, Lieutenant Alfred Schreiber. As part of the EKdo 262 and "Commando Novotny" by October, he won five victories on the Me-262. Like Buttner, Schreiber did not live to see the end of the war, he died in a collision with a Spitfire on November 26, 1944.

In each sortie, the jet pilots shot down several heavy bombers, but Steinhoff believed that the main task of the Me-262 should not be any "Fortresses" and "Liberators", but "Mustangs" and "Thunderbolts" of the escort. Me-262s were supposed to clear the sky for the bombers to attack with piston fighters. He also believed that an inexperienced pilot would never become a "master pilot" of a jet fighter. Hohagen came to similar conclusions on his own. Steinhoff and Hohagen tried to convey their point of view to the high command of the Luftwaffe. Goering considered both commanders to be dissidents, violating Hitler's direct order to attack bombers exclusively on the Me-262, engaging in fighters only "as needed." The Reichsmarschall took out his wrath on Adolf Galland; the fighter general immediately flew to the Parchim airfield, where he expressed his irritation to Steinhoff, however, "... it is not too late to make an effective fighter force out of JG-7."

Galland and Steinhoff planned the first coordinated massive American bomber attack for New Year's Day. During the inspection of advanced airfields, they were overtaken by deafening news - Steinhoff was removed from the post of commander of JG-7, and 30-year-old Major Theodor Weissenberger, commander of I./JG-7, was appointed in his place. Hohagen was removed at the same time as Steihoff. He was replaced by Major Rudolf Zinner. Steinhoff and Hohagen also had a chance to fly the Me-262: in the last weeks of the war they served in the JV-44.

Goering ordered Weissenberger and Zinner to prepare the squadron for combat operations within 15 days. The intensity of training flights increased sharply, and coordination of the actions of fighters and ground-based guidance services was practiced. The combat effectiveness of the squadron grew before our eyes, but the new 1945 began unsuccessfully for JG-7: on January 1, the squadron lost two aircraft.

Lieutenant Heinrich Lönnecker from the 9th Staffel was shot down by a Mustang in a joint sortie with piston fighters from JG-300 and JG-301 (he previously served in this squadron.) sortie. Lönneker was shot down by Lieutenant Franklin Young of the 336th Squadron of the 4th Fighter Group. Me-262A-1 factory N ° 500021 fell on the western outskirts of Fassburg, Lönnecker died. The second Messerschmitt with serial number 500039 had to be written off after a forced landing by Helmut Dityens of II./JG-7; the aircraft's engine failed. The examples given give a clear idea of ​​the danger of flying the Me-262 at that time. Here is how Dityens later spoke about his forced landing:

- The guidance officer of our squadron, Lieutenant Pryusker, discovered an enemy reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic. A pair flew out to intercept, Lieutenant Weber and I. I gave full power to the engines, but Weber fell behind me and soon disappeared from view. The hope of catching the Mosquito or the Lightning by surprise still remained, I lay down on the course recommended by Prüsker to me, but suddenly the thrust of one of the engines fell and it caught fire. I didn’t even know exactly where I was, it was clear that I was flying at a high altitude somewhere above the Baltic Sea, below me there was continuous cloud cover. I relayed the situation to the ground. And switched to a backup frequency. All attempts to call the base on the radio were unsuccessful. I asked for Brandenburg, Larz, Oranienburg - all to no avail. I did not hear anything except the whistling of the wind in the cockpit and the noise of the operation of the turbine that remained in good condition, which also began to "hand over" I completely lost heart when I heard in the headphones: "Board 077, Brandenburg is calling you."

I asked the radar operator to clarify my position and indicate the course to the airfield.

Me-262 from 9./JG 7

- You are probably very close to the airfield, you can hear the roar of engines, turn on the navigation lights.

– You don’t hear me, I’m not above Brandenburg, below me lie snow-covered fields and coastal dunes.

I realized that I would have to make an emergency landing, picked up a suitable platform, but already on the descent I saw that a strip of earth was pitted with shells and bombs, some building flashed to my right. Too late to go around, too late to bail out. I concentrated on landing, slowed down, turned off the engine so that it would not catch fire when it hit the ground. The plane plowed its belly on the sand for about 20-30 meters and stopped. I took a deep breath, unbuckled my seat belts, and disconnected the wires from my headset. A few seconds later, I was on the ground, and then such a wave of fear swept over me, as if I had come under fire from an enemy fighter. I rushed to the very building that I saw on landing. The house was located about a kilometer from the landing site. It turned out that this was not a house, but a camouflaged bunker. No one responded to my loud knock on the armored door, I had to take a stone and pound on the door with renewed vigor. At last the door opened, and the sergeant-major stood on the threshold. He looked at me and said:

- What would you like?

“I just landed here,” I replied.

“This is not an airfield,” snapped the sergeant major.

It turned out that I landed on the territory of the artillery range.

The firing ended just before I landed. The officer put at my disposal a motorcycle with a sidecar, and I arrived home, at the Brandenburg-Brest airfield, before midnight.

Technical problems, lack of spare parts, frequent piloting errors, nasty weather with frequent fogs - all this interfered with the activities of JG-7. The situation did not improve with the relocation of jet fighters to the Kaltenkirchen airfield in Holstein. From this base, Me 262 had to cover Northern Germany - Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck, as well as intercept American bombers on the route to Berlin and back.

Kaltenkirchen became the first base for the 1st group of the 7th squadron. The group was commanded by one of the best fighter pilots of the Reich, Major Erich Rudorffer, who had more than 200 victories to his credit. Rudorffer took command of the group from Weisenberger, who was appointed squadron commander. Weisenberger made a lot of efforts to make the squadron combat ready, but all efforts were shattered by a lack of equipment and technology - it was not until mid-February that I./JG-7 reached a state of limited combat capability.

All three staffers of the first group were led by well-known aces - Lieutenants Hans-Peter Waldman, Hans Grünberg and Fritz Style; Waldman and Grunberg were holders of the Knight's Cross. Steele and Grinberg survived, Waldman died on March 18, 1945.

In January, the JG-7 pilots managed to achieve several victories, but the main efforts were still focused on education and training, dealing with the endless problems of the YuMO-004 engines. The squadron continued to lose men and aircraft. The first loss of I./JG-7 was due to a hardware malfunction. In flight on the plane of non-commissioned officer Hans Werner, the engine failed, the pilot lost control and crashed in the Alvesloh area. The weather was also not favorable for flights - low cloud cover constantly closed the Me-262 base airfields: Brandenburg-Brest, Parchim and Oranienburg. Nevertheless, in the first days of February, the regiment of "jet" aces of the 7th squadron arrived - Lieutenant Rudolf Rademacher from III. / JG-7 joined the club of the elite, having achieved another victory, by the end of the war he became one of the most productive Me-262 pilots . Like many Me-262 pilots, by the time he switched to jet technology, Rademacher already had vast combat experience, as part of I. And III. / JG-54, he shot down 81 enemy aircraft. Immediately before retraining on the Me-262, Rademacher served as an instructor in l./Erg.Gr (Ergantsungsgruppe Nord), in this position, in parallel with retraining on the Me-262, he continued to fly sorties and shot down five American bombers. For my combat work on the Eastern Front, Rademacher received the Knight's Cross. The ace made its first flight on a jet fighter on January 30, 1945, and just two days later he already won the first victory on the Me-262 as part of 11 Staffel III./JG-7. On commands from the ground, Rademacher went into the tail of the Spitfire flying at an altitude of 11,000 m above Braunschweig and, hiding in the contrail of an English aircraft, suddenly attacked. The Spitfire was blown to pieces by a point-blank salvo of four 30mm cannons. Two days later - another victory: an American B-17 shot down over Magdeburg; On February 9, Rademacher shot down two more Flying Fortresses over Berlin. The day of February 9 turned out to be successful for the pilots of III./JG-7 and perhaps the most productive for the jet pilots of the entire war: in addition to Rademacher, Oberleutnant Günther Wegmann, Hauptmann Herg-Peter Eder and Lieutenant Karl Schnörer won victories. On Valentine's Day, Rademacher intercepted a B-17 on the route to Neumünster, two days later he increased his combat score by shooting down his first American fighter, the P-51D Mustang. Eight days later, over Halle and Leipzig, Rademaheo shot down another B-17 and "Liberator" In total, in February, Rademacher shot down at least seven enemy aircraft on the Me-262.

Rademacher continued to increase his winning score in March and April, bringing it to at least 16 shot down, but only eight victories can be reliably said.

The successes of individual pilots like Rademacher did not make the difference: the "green" Me-262 pilots continued to fall one after another, the Me-262 claimed the lives of experienced fighter pilots. On February 21, 1945, the flight career of Oberfeldwebel Helmut Budach, who began flying the Me-262 in EKdo 262, ended. His plane received shells over Schönewald. Budach decided to jump, but when he got out of the cab, the air current dragged him through a torch of hot exhaust gases from the turbine. Budakh was able to land by parachute, but died a few days later in the hospital from his burns. On February 21, while repelling an Allied bomber raid (Operation Clarion), two Mustangs were shot down by the commander of 9./JG-7 Oberleutnant Hans-Peter Waldman.

During this period of intense activity, other pilots of the squadron also increased their combat score. Georg-Peter Eder began his service in the Luftwaffe even before the war, he won his first victories during the Battle of Britain and in the initial period of "Operation Barbarossa". In June 1944, Eder was awarded the Knight's Cross, and on September 27, 1944, he was assigned to EKdo 262. On November 8, Eder was standing next to Galland at the Ahmir airfield when Walter Nowotny died before their eyes, and it was Eder Galland who immediately appointed commander "Commando Novotny". For three "Flying Fortresses" shot down in one battle, Eder was awarded the "oak leaves" to the Knight's Cross. Eder was one of the first Luftwaffe pilots to practice head-on attacks on enemy bombers. In such attacks, he shot down at least 17 and damaged 14 aircraft. Eder also became famous as a successful master of attacks on ground targets. During the last offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes, about 40 Thunderbolts stationed at the airfields suffered from the fire of Eder's Me-262 cannons. In general, "Thunderbolts" and "Flying Fortresses" became the favorite prey of the German ace, he continued to shoot them down singly and in pairs throughout April 1945.

On account of Eder, the last shot down by the Luftwaffe "Flying Fortress". The air battle took place over Berlin on April 17, 1945, Eder's victim was a B-17G "The Towering Titan" bomber from the 305th bomber air group.

In early 1945, the pilots of JG-7 operated mainly in pairs and fours, unsuccessfully trying to cover the skies of Berlin from Allied aircraft. Since March, tactics have changed, a significant number of Me-262s began to be thrown into battle at the same time. For the first time, such tactics were tested on March 3, when all combat-ready fighters of the JG-7 and III. -7, total - 29 aircraft.

At 10.15 an air battle broke out between the cities of Magdeburg and Braunschweig. The formation of American bombers was attacked by pilots of 9./JG-7, among whom were such pilots as Büschner, Gutmann, Schnörer, Wegmann. The Messerschmitts ran into a wall of barrage fire from the riflemen. Hauptmann Heinz Gutmann died getting out of the cockpit of the Me-262A-1 on fire (serial number "110558). Gutmann had only two shot down (both on the Me-262), but he was deservedly considered one of the best bomber pilots in the Reich and in April 1944 he received the Knight's Cross.

Following the fighters of the 9th Staffel, Me-262s from the headquarters of the squadron, the 10th and 11th Staffels, rushed into the attack. On that day, over Magdeburg, the Americans missed six bombers and three fighters. . Major Rudi Zinner and jet veteran Helmut Lennartz won one victory each.

In March, JG-7 pilots used R4M air-to-air missiles for the first time. These missiles were tested in Rechlin throughout 1944. The missiles were tested in combat on 18 March. The effect of the use of rockets was amazing: with a direct hit by a rocket, the bomber exploded in the air. Due to the massive use of missiles, it was not possible to determine the exact number of downed bombers, and even more so to determine which of the pilots shot down which aircraft. The result of the combat work on March 18 was entered into the general account of the squadron. Pilots of JG-7 that day shot down 13 enemy aircraft at the cost of losing three pilots and five Me-262s.

One of the three pilots shot down on March 18 was Lieutenant Günther Wegmann, and Lieutenant Karl Schnörer became his successor as staff captain of 9./JG-7. Wegmann spoke in a hospital bed about his last fight:

- I attacked the B-17 over Glöven, the shells of my guns pierced the wing of the Fortress, but the Me-262 also received hits, after the attack I felt a sharp pain in my right leg, I felt the leg with my hand, not feeling much discomfort. Since the plane was able to continue flying, I decided to try to reach Parchim, but at an altitude of 4000 m, the right engine caught fire - I had to jump. On the ground, I quickly fell into the hands of Red Cross nurses, and a few hours after landing, my right leg was amputated.

On March 18, the squadron lost one of its best pilots - 23-year-old Lieutenant Hans-Peter Waldmann did not return from a combat mission. Waldmann began his career as a military pilot in 1940 and first saw action in 1942 on the Eastern Front. Fighting in JG-52, he rose to the rank of staff captain and for 85 downed aircraft in February 1944 he received the Knight's Cross, in total he won 125 victories in the East. After the Allied landing in Normandy, Waldmann and his Staffel were transferred to the West, where they became part of JG-3, over France, Hans-Peter increased his combat score to 132 victories. In December 1944, the entire staff of Waldmann arrived in Lacker-Leckfeld for retraining on the Me-262. Staffel became part of I./JG-7. Waldmann conducted his first dogfight in a jet fighter on February 22, 1945, shooting down two Mustangs at once. Waldmann posthumously received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross. This is how Waldman's last battle on the "yellow troika" (Me-262A-1 factory N ° 117097) in 1992 was recalled by the ace's partner Lieutenant Hans-Dieter Weiss:

- The weather in the Kaltenkirchen area was disgusting - low dense clouds hung directly above the airfield, the end of the runway was lost in a haze. We were told that the upper limit of the clouds was at about 6000 m, and the weather could not be expected to improve. On this day, approximately 2,000 American aircraft, including 1,300 bombers, were expected to attack Berlin. Our duty officer, in my opinion, that day was Oberleutnant Grunberg, called by Goering himself. The Reichsmarschall demanded that all personnel be urgently gathered in the flight room so that we could hear him. Goering demanded to take off immediately, his tirade ended with a dirty curse, sounding in "decent" language as "a company of old women." We started in line. Since I was the only pilot with experience in instrument flight, I was destined to lead the "shwarma". We decided to break through the clouds in close formation, wing to wing. To my right was flying my leading Oberfenrich Schrei, to my left was the staffel commander, Oberleutnant Hans-Peter Waldmann, followed by Oberfeldwebel Gerhard Reicher. On takeoff, Reicher's turbine failed, and there were three of us left. After takeoff, we made a circle without entering the clouds. At about 700 m, Waldmann's plane disappeared from sight, leaving only Shrei with me. Soon I saw Waldmann's plane below and behind me. Waldmann tried to attach himself to my fighter, but, breaking through the clouds, he lost sight of my Me-262. We collided. Without a second's hesitation, I used the parachute. The plane went into an erratic fall. I landed safely right at the house of the railway master of the Hamburg-Berlin railway line. The explosions of both fallen Messerschmitts were clearly audible. Shrei was also unlucky. A flight of Mustangs fell right on him from the clouds. Shrey jumped out with a parachute, but the Americans shot him in the air. Immediately after landing, I raised the local Volkssturm to search for Waldmann, whose parachute, like himself, was missing from the Me-262. We found Waldman quite far from the plane - he was dead.

Weiss, the only one of the three pilots who went into the air that morning, remained alive. Weiss joined the Luftwaffe in 1936, it was he who replaced Waldmann as staff captain of 3./JG-7, until the end of the war Weiss shot down eight enemy aircraft on the Me-262.

The first victories on the Me-262 in March were won by another future "jet" ace - fighter pilot III. / JG-7 Alfred Ambs, who had seven shot down at the end of the war. On the morning of March 4, Ambs, together with Lieutenant Jachim Weber and Sergeant Giefing, took off from the Brandenburg-Brest airfield to intercept an enemy reconnaissance. After 20 minutes of flight, Ambs and his comrades discovered a pair of Mustangs (probably reconnaissance version - F-6). Weber opened fire too early, spooked the Americans and allowed them to get out of the way. Taking advantage of the superiority in speed, the three Me-262 attacked the second time in the forehead. At a closing speed of about 1400 km / h, Ambs managed to put the shells of his guns into one of the Mustangs from a distance of about 300 m. "The R-51 shattered into a thousand pieces," Ambs recalled. The second scout was shot down by Weber.

On March 19, over Chemnitz, a group of 28 Me-262s from III./JG-7 intercepted the "Flying Fortresses" from the 3rd Air Division of the US Air Force. At least four bombers were shot down by R4M missiles.

The fuel crisis that had engulfed the Jagdgeschwaders flying piston fighters since the end of 1944 now reached the JG-7. Stocks of high-octane gasoline for voracious YuMO-004 turbines have halved, and in addition, American aircraft have increasingly begun to bomb Me-262 airfields, factories for the production of components and assemblies for jet fighters, and training bases. The combination of all factors posed a deadly threat to the Luftwaffe's jet aircraft.

Me-262 clearly demonstrated its potential for five days from March 18 to March 22, 1945; during this period of time, rocket pilots shot down at least 50 enemy aircraft. The success revived the enthusiasm for jet aviation in the political elite of the Reich. Hitler again began to broadcast that the Me-262 is a weapon that can change the course of the war.

In the next two weeks, Major Heinrich Erler (Ace No. 2 of the Luftwaffe) opened his combat account with JG-7. Generally speaking, it is still a mystery how the commander of the Scandinavian-based III./JG-5 managed to win 201 victories, well, where did he find such a number of Allied airplanes in his Norway? For his successes, Erler was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. However, at the end of 1944, fortune turned away from Erler, he fell under the tribunal for not saving the battleship Tirpitz from the Lancaster raid. On November 12, 1944, the British sank the ship in Altenfjord, Major received a reprieve only due to his impressive combat score and the lack of experienced pilots to fly the Me-262. Like most aces, Erler quickly mastered the jet aircraft and already on March 21 shot down the "Flying Fortress" on the Me-262. The next day, Erler sent another B-17 to the ground, and on the 31st he shot down a Mustang from the escort group.

Erler made his last sortie on April 6, 1945. Over Schaarlippe, the ace managed to shoot down a couple of Fortresses before he himself was shot down by two Mustangs.

The successful actions of the fighters of the 7th squadron against the Allied bombers reached their apogee on March 31, 1945. Opponents of the I./JG-7 and II./JG-7 pilots operating on the Me-262, armed with R4M missiles, were not aircraft in four air battles US Air Force, and the Halifaxes and Lancasters of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain. The targets of the British bombers were Bremen, Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven. On that day, the pilots of JG-7 chalked up 21 bombers shot down. The Messerschmitts attacked the bombers at great speed, ignoring the escort fighters. A number of pilots shot down one plane each, and Grunberg, Sturm, Todt, Schenck, Schall and Ehrig chalked up two shot down each, Weiss and Gerhard Reiser distinguished themselves three times.

However, the very next day, April 1, Kalternkirchen had to be evacuated; The 1st staffel of I./JG-7 flew to Brandenburg-Brest, the 2nd to Burg, the 3rd to Oranienburg. Three days later, the commander of the group, Major Erich Rudorffer, received an order from the headquarters of JG-7, notifying that all staffs of the group would henceforth operate autonomously from each other and independently of the squadron. Throughout March, the pilots of JG-7 managed to prove that the squadron was an outstanding fighter unit of the Second World War, but this month the most experienced pilots of the squadron also died, and the number of combat-ready fighters in JG-7 at the end of March was no more than 60 aircraft.

On the first day of April, seven more American bombers fell victim to Me-262 pilots. The Americans fought back three days later. "Mustangs" literally tore apart the staffs based in Parchim, lying in wait for the Me-262 on takeoff. On that day, R-51 pilots shot down 15 jet fighters. A participant in the battle on April 1, pilot of the 504th squadron of the 339th fighter air group of the US Air Force Robert Havigharst recalled:

- We found a trio of Me-262s breaking through the clouds and dived on them. When the Me-262 was within range of the machine guns of my Mustang, I opened fire. The Messerschmitt dodged the bursts with a left turn, but due to the speed gained on the dive, I managed to stay on its tail and shoot through its left wing plane. In the meantime, I myself came under fire from anti-aircraft artillery, I had to drop external fuel tanks in order to perform a sharp anti-aircraft maneuver. The Me-262 used a pause and again went into climb, but I still got it with bursts from machine guns. Hits on the fuselage and wing planes were perfectly observed. At an altitude of approximately 600 m, the Messer went into a dive. I did not see a parachute, apparently the German pilot was killed.

The commander of the jet fighters that took off that morning was Rudy Zinner, who, despite all his vast experience and excellent command of the jet fighter, could not resist the four Mustangs. Zinner was lucky that he managed to use a parachute.

Daytime bomber raids continued to torment the airfields where jet fighters were based, and J-2 fuel supplies for YuMO-004 engines were also decreasing day by day. By mid-April, several JG-7 staffels had to be relocated to Bavaria and Czechoslovakia, organizational structure squadron actually fell apart.

Allied fighters terrorized the jet pilots, lying in wait for them on takeoff or landing. On April 17, over the Saatz airfield, a group of Mustangs and Thunderbolts fell on a landing Me-262, led by Oberleutnant Grunberg. The Germans had no chance - all four aircraft were shot down. Only Grunberg managed to jump out with a parachute. Meanwhile, the combat score of JG-7 was also growing, but not as fast as in March.

On April 30, 1945, an order came to create a new formation, JV-44, on the basis of the IV./JG-7 being formed.

JV -44: NOT THE FIRST, BUT THE LAST

Disagreements between the front commanders of the fighter formations and the high command of the Luftwaffe, led by Goering and his few henchmen, reached a climax at the end of 1944. The Reichsmarschall blamed Adolf Galland for all the sins, removing the latter from the post of "General der Jagdflieger". Galland's resignation, embellished with diplomatic expressions, is framed in an order dated January 23, 1945:

- After several years of Lieutenant General Galland's tenure as "General der Jagdflieger", his health has deteriorated so much that he can no longer be a leader.

Even earlier, on January 19, a delegation of high-ranking comrades-in-arms of Galland gathered in the "Aviation House" popular among pilots - the Luftwaffe officers' club in Berlin. The "soloist" was the commander of JG-3, Colonel Günter Lützow, who became an ace back in Spain, as part of the Condor Legion. Among the claims he made against Goering were the erroneous use of available forces and incompetent outside interference in the actions of fighters (the influence of the "bomber barons" surrounding Goering, especially Major General Dietrich Peltz, was clearly manifested during the Bodenplatte operation, disastrous for the Luftwaffe, carried out three weeks earlier the attacks on Allied airfields).

This Me 262 fighter-bomber was from the beginning part of the KG5J, then fell into the JV44 (and then into the hands of the British)

The discussion of the situation lasted approximately five hours. Of course, the participants did not forget the need to reinstate Galand in his position and rights. It is clear that such a meeting aroused the displeasure of the Reichsmarschall, who established a real autocratic administration in the Luftwaffe. Göring's immediate reaction to the report of the Haus der Flieger conversations was to want to kill Lützow. Lützow and Galland, although Galland did not attend the commemorative party, were arrested a few hours after the meeting of the "troublemakers" ended. Lützow escaped with a link to Verona for the post of commander of the fighter units of Upper Italy.

The fate of Galland was determined by his successor in the post of "General der Jagdflieger" Colonel Gordon Gollob: Galland was sent as staff captain of 4./JG-54 to the Russian front. An amazing career zigzag: from lieutenant general to squadron commander! However, Galland never got into JG-54; Hitler personally intervened in the case of the "troublemaker". The Fuhrer did not hear anything about the events in the "Haus der Flieger", however, having received information about what had happened, he determined another punishment for the disgraced lieutenant general. "Galland stood up for jet aircraft, now let him lead the Me-262 staff and prove their advantages in practice!"

Galland was offered only a staffel, but his hands were completely untied, freeing him from subordination to the chiefs of medium caliber, and the lieutenant general himself had disciplinary power similar to that of a squadron commander.

Galland chose the Brandenburg-Brest airfield, located 45 km from the city limits of Berlin, as the base location - an ideal place for the deployment of fighters that defended the capital. On the other hand, part of the JG-7 staffers were based here, from which Galland expected to receive technical assistance. Galland really received help, despite Gollob's written ban on the interaction of Galland's unit with any other units. Although the official order for the formation of JV44 was dated February 24, 1945, the unit received its first aircraft on February 10, 1945. These days, the first pilots also arrived in part.

Galland complained that the man who held the post of "General der Jagdflieger" interfered at every turn, especially in the selection of personnel for key Staffel posts. Gollob refuted Galland's claims, focusing on the fact that the front-line fighter formations are already experiencing a shortage of experienced commanders, and Galland should not be allowed to select the best, thereby exposing the front. As a result, Galland managed to obtain permission to take under his command only one ace, "the disgraceful Haus der Flieger", ex-commander of JG-7 Johannes Steinhoff, the rest of the personnel were recruited from wounded pilots, instructors of training units and even unfired "green" newcomers . The Luftwaffe Personnel Office had assigned a number of inexperienced rookie jetmen who had just completed training in III/EJG2. Galland instructed Steinhoff to conduct intensive training for newcomers on the Me 262, while he himself began to make plans for how to get experienced pilots for the JV44. He personally traveled to hospitals and Aviation Houses, talking to pilots whom he knew well, offering them the opportunity to once again go against the enemy with the best weapons that the Luftwaffe could give. In the second half of February 1945 "masters" appeared in JV44. First came Lieutenant Kaiser, who fought on all fronts. Lieutenant K. Neumann, who had flown the Me 262 since December 1944, moved from the headquarters of JG7, and had quite a lot of experience in piloting this machine. Major K. G. Schnell also arrived, whom Galland brought from the hospital without permission. Galland was going to invite E. Hartmann to his unit, but he said that because of his youth he would have to fly as a wingman with one of the older pilots and refused. Subsequently, while sitting in Soviet camps, Luftwaffe ace No. 1 often regretted it. All these people and their experience were of great help to Steinhoff in the preparation of JV44. The technical officer (engineer) of the unit was Lieutenant G. Farmann, the former slave of Steingoff; Galland demanded him from JG7. Later, these functions were transferred to Major Hohagen, who had much more experience in organizing technical support.

Galland did not use his own name to refer to the "Commando" being formed. Instead of the traditional Luftwaffe name "Commando Galland", he named his unit Jagdverband-44 (Jagdverband - fighter unit), the index "44" appeared in memory of the very first staffel, 3.J / 88, which Galland commanded in Spain. Dividing 88 by two equals 44. The official order for the formation of JV44 was issued on February 24, 1945:

"JV44 in Brandenburg-Brest. The unit commander has disciplinary rights commander of the division, in all respects subordinate to the air fleet "Reich". Galland's special unit includes 16 Me 262s and 15 pilots

Signed - Lieutenant General Koller.

It was clear to Galland and Steinhoff that neither novice nor experienced pilots should be allowed to fight against superior enemy forces until they fully mastered the Me 262. Throughout March, training flights continued for the pilots who formed the rudiment of the JV-44. During this period, the only combat collision with enemy aircraft took place. Steinhoff took Lieutenant Blomert, one of the newcomers, with him that day. About the level of his previous fighter training, Steingoff said: "Blomert came from the" bombers ", he flew the Ju 88 and did his last loop while still in flight school. It's hard for him to fly on the Me-262!" After the start, they headed east - to the Oder. They kept the railway to Frankfurt, which led to the river. Here there were stubborn fierce battles. They crossed the river. Directly in front of Steinhoff's Me 262, a Russian fighter appeared. The German pilot was unable to react: since the Schwalbe's speed was much greater, the Soviet aircraft was left far behind. Steinhoff soon saw a group of 12 red star fighters approaching ahead. I tried to catch one of them in the scope, but the Russians noticed this and began to maneuver more intensively. So he decided to go out of sight, come back hiding behind the clouds, and then fly through the group at full throttle and shoot down one.

Steinhoff flew off and began looking for Blomert's plane. I saw him far behind: an inexperienced pilot could not hold on to the leader. Steinhoff took off the throttle and made a left turn. A minute later Blomert caught up with him. The host again went on the attack and entered the Soviet fighters from the side of the sun at a speed of 870 km / h. "Schwalbe" was too fast. Like lightning, Steinhoff flew past the Soviet planes, firing from cannons. But not a single plane was shot down.

Steinhoff again began to look for Blomert. He was 2 km lower, trying to catch up with the commander. Glancing at the clock, 25 minutes of flight had passed. The colonel chose a course that led him to the other side of the Oder at an altitude of 1000 m. Again he wanted to attack a group of Russian fighters, but suddenly he saw 6-7 Il-2s firing at German positions. Steinhoff radioed the command: "Blomert, turn left and follow me!" And at the same time he went to the left. The last attack aircraft appeared in his sight. The short queue seems to be passing by. Steinhoff turned and saw that smoke was coming from the IL-2. The pilot headed home, with difficulty Blomert joined him, who again could not hold on to the leader. With the last drops of fuel, they landed at the Brandenburg-Brest airfield.

During one of the training flights, two more victories were recorded on the JV44 account. Here is what the author of these victories, Colonel Steinhoff, wrote:

- One of the March days, I wanted to teach one of the beginners how to fly in pairs. After takeoff, we headed for our "training area" at the Oder. We crossed the river, on the other side we saw a group of Russian fighters. I wanted to attack on the move, but again I was let down by the lead angle when firing, which for the “reactive” is different from that of the old Bf 109s. I unsuccessfully flew through the formation several times. Then something appeared in front of me that turned out to be a Russian fighter. Instinctively, I fired four 30mm cannons. Like lightning, a cloud of debris swept around my cockpit, and the remains of a Soviet fighter fell to the ground. It literally fell apart in the air! Looking back at the group I was attacking, I saw the Soviet fighters moving east at full throttle.

I turn around, descend, and find a lone fighter with red stars below me, flying to the west. I catch him in the scope and shoot. Its pilot twitched, tried to escape at low level, and crashed into the top of a hill. I turn around and look at my ward. He is not far away, on my command he comes up to me, and we fly home.

It is worth noting that the few Me 262s that appeared on the Eastern Front also suffered losses from Soviet fighters. In March-April 1945, at least three Soviet pilots - captains Kozhedub (La-7), Kuznetsov (Yak-9) and Markveladze (Yak-9) announced the destruction of enemy jet aircraft, and Lieutenant Sivko (Yak-9) died in combat against a pair of Me 262s, knocking down one of them.

At the end of March, Galland made every effort to withdraw his unit from the Berlin area. Officially, "First and Last" motivated his requests by the need to cover industrial areas Germany, located in the southern part of the country, Messerschmitt's factories in particular, from raids by Allied heavy bombers. In fact, Galland did not want to give his pilots to the slaughter of Soviet tankers. A powerful push by the Red Army towards Berlin was expected from day to day.

The JV-44 commander received the order to relocate on March 31, 1945, but preparations for relocation to the Munich-Riem airfield began a few days earlier. The first train to leave Brandenburg was the train carrying the rear of JV 44 - equipment, weapons, tractors, cars, kitchen and spare parts for Me 262. Due to bad weather, the ferrying of aircraft did not begin until April 3, 1945.

Following Galland's "reagents" came the "shot" of Colonel Gollob: in a four-page report on the actions of jet fighters, "General der Jagdflieger" wrote about the work of the JV-44 in the Berlin area:

- ... the Yagdverband-44 unit did not achieve any success, although it was staffed with very experienced pilots. Moreover, it used inadequate tactical methods, contrary to generally accepted ones. It is necessary to come up with a proposal to disband this unit, and send the personnel for further service in other units more appropriate to their status.

Dated April 3, 1945, the report was intended to be sent to all senior officials of the Luftwaffe, including Goering himself.

Galland continued to go his own way. Moving away from Berlin, which was full of internal squabbles, he began to recruit new pilots and seek the delivery of new aircraft armed with R4M missiles from the Messerschmitt factory.

The first success in the air war with the Americans fell to the JV-44 on April 4, when non-commissioned officer Eduard Schallmoser shot down a Lightning over Munich, or rather Schallmoser rammed an American fighter. Rammed not intentionally, but the effect still turned out to be excellent - the P-38 lost its tail and fell, while the German pilot managed to land the Me-262. Eduard Schallmoser got into similar situations several times, for which he received the nickname "Jet Rammer" - jet rammer.

On April 4, 1945, JV 44 aircraft met for the first time in a dogfight with American aircraft. Mustang pilots from the 324th Fighter Air Group of the 15th Air Army met a Me-262 group over Munich. Lieutenant A. Candis and Lieutenant J.V. Hawn was recorded under one damaged jet fighter, and Lieutenant R.A. Deci - one downed Me-262. Between 16.20 and 16.35, another group of American 325 FG fighters collided with Me 262 near Munich, and Lieutenant W. Day damaged one of them.

German sources do not mention these battles, so today it is impossible to firmly state how plausible the reports of American pilots are.

The main task JV 44 was intercepting Allied bomber formations. Due to the large cover area and low acceleration characteristics, Me 262s from JV 44 were forced to operate in triples, while JG 7 usually used four. The trio of aircraft was chosen because of the poor maneuverability of jet fighters, which found it difficult to maintain formation during maneuvers. The two rear aircraft usually flew slightly lower so as not to lose the wingman during maneuvers due to poor visibility from the aircraft down.

To attack the bombers, JV 44 usually used at least a squadron - usually nine fighters or three triples. One link was leading, the other two flew behind and above. The interval between the aircraft was 100 m and 150 m in height, between links - 300 m. When flying more than one squadron, others took a seat behind and slightly higher. When a formation of bombers was detected, the links were divided and attacked from behind one by one. When using several squadrons of interceptors, each of them attacked "its" group of bombers. The attack began 5 km from the target, usually from an excess of 2000 m. Me 262 reorganized into a column and dived 500 m below the bombers and 1500 m before them, then climbed again to be directly behind it at 1000 m. The main goal of this maneuver was the desire to gain speed of 850 km / h, which excluded the opposition of the escort fighters, although a lower speed was preferable for accurate aiming. During the attack, the link tried to act as openly as possible in order to break the "wall" of defensive fire from the bombers.

The pilots of JV 44 used the usual Revy 16B sight, but with specially applied marks corresponding to the B-17 wing span at a distance of 600 m. 150 m with the aim of Me 262 climbed a little in order to pass as close as possible over the formation of bombers, thereby making it difficult for the B-17 air gunners to fire. The passage under the formation of bombers was considered dangerous, since the wreckage of damaged bombers and spent cartridges, poured in large numbers, could get into the air intakes of turbojet engines.

After passing over the bombers, an attack followed by a group of bombers following the course, or by diving out of the battle. They did not try to assemble a group after the attack - the formation was scattered too widely, and the fuel supply was too small. A frontal attack was unrealistic due to the too high approach speed, which did not allow accurate aiming and firing.

Having met with Allied fighters, the commander of the Me 262 group decided whether to take the fight most often, depending on the availability of a margin of speed. Me 262s climbed up and attacked from above. The Allied fighter pilots had no choice but to turn towards the attacking jets, since the one that continued to fly in a straight line usually went down. Me 262s usually went up and repeated the attack. If the Allied fighters formed a defensive circle, the Me 262 dived from above and opened fire, trying to make a turn after the "circle", after which they went up. Dragging out the battle on turns for the Me 262 has always been unprofitable.

On April 5, 1945, JV 44 pilots were raised to intercept a group of Flying Fortresses and Liberators. A "box" of four-engine bombers formed in Paris airspace and headed northeast. Five Me-262s took off from Riem. In the first attack, the jet fighters shot down two B-17s with missiles. Two more B-17s were so badly damaged that they must have been written off on their return. In addition to the bombers, the Americans lost one Mustang escort.

Having used up their rockets, the JV-44 pilots fired on the second wave of American bombers, consisting of Liberators, from the side guns. The pilot of one of the "Liberators" Ch. Beimen recalled:

“I was in command of the Liberator. We were deep in German airspace when a high-speed aircraft flashed to the right. “What was that?” my co-pilot shouted. Messerschmitt-262 is a jet,” I replied. We saw three B-24s in flames go to the ground. Their crews, apparently, did not have time to understand anything. So unexpected was the attack of German jet fighters. The gunners reported seeing Me-262s flying around us. Where the hell is our fighter cover? At that moment, the bomber shook from machine-gun fire, the cockpit was filled with smoke from burnt gunpowder. One Me-262 flew over our heads; the gunners' machine guns fired like mad. "Jet" with every second decreased, its speed fell. I saw it explode right in front of our formation. Me-262 attacked us twice. In the second attack we lost two more B-24s. About fifty of our guys died then."

JV-44 pilots shot down seven American four-engine bombers, and several more were damaged. One of the bombers shot down Schallmoser in the "normal way". R4M missiles have proven to be very effective weapons. The name of the pilot who died in the Me 262 explosion is unknown. Probably one of the newcomers.

Colonel Steinhoff took off on April 8 with his wingmen Lieutenant Farchmann and Captain Krupinski. We went to the first spurs of the Alps at an altitude of 6000 m. Steinhoff said: "Lightnings" on the left, below! ", After which he began to climb. Farhmann could not resist in the ranks, remaining 1000 m lower. Steinhoff attacked the Americans from a dive. Again let him know an old mistake when attacking the Me-262 was the wrong lead when firing.The shells of his guns did not hit a single aircraft, but his Schwalbe also slipped through the American formation undamaged.

Steinhoff continued flying towards Stuttgart. The control center in Stuttgart reported the appearance of enemy bombers. The colonel climbed to a height of 8000 m, where Farhmann finally joined his plane. A minute later, the third Me-262 pulled up, piloted by Walter Krupinski.

The bombers turned out to be "Fortresses" and "Liberators" of the 8th Air Army, going to Regensburg. Steinhof attacked first. He pierced the formation of the escort fighters, but he failed to launch missiles at the bombers: the launch device did not work and the missiles did not leave the rails. I had to use artillery. Steinhoff turned around and saw the engines of one of the Liberators enveloped in flames and black smoke. The second four-engine bomber shot down Fakhrmann, and then one B-17 sent Krupinski to the ground. Farchmann managed to knock out another B-17, he damaged his right engine. A minute later he was attacked by enemy fighters. Steingoff looked out for his wingman, but to no avail. The amount of fuel forced him to return to Riem. Immediately after landing, he began to ask about his friend. But no one knew anything about him - only two "Schwalbe" landed - Steingof and Krupinski.

What happened to Farhmann? When entering the attack, the arrows damaged the right engine of his aircraft. Farchmann tried to escape with his damaged aircraft, but was spotted by four escort fighters. The Me-262 was deprived of its main trump card - the advantage in speed. American fighters bombarded the Schwalbe with bullets. Farchmann had one way left - from the cockpit with a parachute to the ground. He opened the cockpit canopy, unfastened the seat belts, and the air flow literally “sucked” him out of the cockpit. The fighter significantly overtook the pilot, but they reached the earth's surface in almost one place on the banks of the Danube. Farhmann was shot down by Lieutenant J. Usyatinsky from the 358th Fighter Air Group of the 9th Air Army.

The relocation from Brandenburg to Munich had certain disadvantages. The Jagdverband fell directly into the center of the strikes of American bombers, which attacked the centers of production of German jet aircraft. For two weeks in mid-April, JV-44 suffered heavy losses during Allied air raids. The result of the April 9 raid by the Fortress armada on Munich was the completely disabled airfield of the airfield in Riem and six Me-262s that burned out on it. In the air, the Galland team lost another Schwalbe. Major E. Giller, a pilot of the R-51 fighter from the 55th Fighter Group, chalked it up:

“We escorted a large formation of bombers in a raid on Munich. Directly in front of the target, we got into light cloud cover. I was walking at an altitude of 7000 m. Jumping out of the clouds, I ran right into the Me-262. A couple of Mustangs were already chasing him. turned left hoping to intercept him. I had an advantage in altitude, due to which there was some chance of success. I caught up with him after about 10 minutes. The jet turned slightly and began to descend. In doing so, we were right over the outskirts of Munich: Me 262 I went at an altitude of 300 m, and I at 2000 m. Then I lost him again for a minute, then found him - he was approaching the Riem airfield. I gave full throttle and finally caught up with the German at an altitude of 150 m, just 100 m before the runway. I fired several bursts, clearly observed the hit on the left wing and fuselage. The German had already released the landing gear, its speed was about 400 km / h. On my speed indicator, the arrow was trembling near the risk corresponding to 720 km / h, so I flew above them, he took the handle back to gain height again. When I turned around, I saw that my opponent lay on his belly about 100 m behind the lane. He did not burn - apparently left without fuel. The German plane must have been destroyed."

Major Giller's story confirms the opinion of the Me-262 pilots: the Schwalbe is most vulnerable during takeoff and landing. The described attack is a classic example of the fight against Me 262.

In addition to Giller, another Me-262 was chalked up to another Mustang pilot from the 55th Fighter Air Group, Lieutenant G. Moore. However, Moore's victory is not confirmed and the details are unknown.

And what do German documents write about April 9? The enemy air force launched an attack on Munich and the Riem airfield. Several enemy bombers were shot down during that raid. Airstrips in Riem are badly damaged, water and electricity supply is interrupted. Hangars and workshops were damaged, several fuel tanks were destroyed. Intensive work has begun to eliminate the damage, but the airfield could not function for at least two days. "For Galland and his pilots, this meant that they would not be able to take off against the enemy. On April 10, Galland was called by Goering to Obersaltzbergen. Galland later wrote about this :

- The Reichsmarshall received me with amazing attention, asked me to inform about the first battles of my unit. All his skepticism about the Me-262 in the defense of the Reich disappeared. Göring confirmed that I was right about using the Me 262.

Me 262 from JV44

On April 10, the Mustangs destroyed three more jet fighters on the ground, and three Me-262s received "heavy damage. The number of jet fighters disabled by the Mustangs on the ground grew by leaps and bounds. Galland decided to organize base patrols FW-190D-9 fighters, but they were able to shoot down only one attacking fighter and did not provide airfield protection.

At the Riem airfield, the staff worked hard to get the runway up and running. The pilots of the 353rd Fighter Air Group constantly interfered with the work, dropping small fragmentation bombs and firing at everything that moves.

The next day, bombers of the 8th Air Force hit Riem.

The runway in Riem was brought into a divine form only on April 16, 1945. JV-44 aircraft got the opportunity to take part in air battles. The first of these was the attack of four Me-262s on a group of B-26s. Galland himself led the attack on the Schwalbe pilots. Later he wrote:

“Near Landsberg, we encountered a group of 16 Maruders. We attacked them from a distance of about 600 m with a volley of missiles in formation. I saw two hits. One aircraft caught fire and exploded. The second lost most of the right wing and began to fall straight down. Successfully attacked and three of my wingmen. My wingman, E. Schallmoser, who rammed a Lightning over Riem a few days ago, did not fire until he was very close to the B-26. He opened fire on an enemy bomber when it was too late to turn away. The planes collided. Both cars began to fall to the ground, none of us thought that the young pilot had a chance to survive. But in the evening the phone rang - Schallmoser spoke from the outskirts of Kemlhn. A car was sent for the pilot. They waited a long time until they brought him, finally Schallmoser appeared, the pilot was injured Most of all, the "rammer" regretted that he could not visit his mother, who lived not far from the place where he jumped out.

In the afternoon, Galland's pets again rose to intercept, this time the objects of their attacks were the four-engine bombers of the 8th Air Force of the US Air Force, which bombed Rosenheim located south of Munich. Again there was a collision with American fighters. Major L. Norley recalled:

"We provided direct cover for the" box "of bombers all the way. Near Munich itself, at an altitude of about 700 m, they noticed a single Me-262 flying to the southeast. I sent one link to follow him, and if he goes to land - shoot down. However, the pilot jet aircraft noticed them, gave gas and flew away."

The pilots of JV 44 were successful - they attacked the Fortress formation and shot down three cars.

In parallel with the constant losses, the JV-44 received new fighters straight from the Messerschmitt factory, and new pilots arrived. Galland and Steingoff toured the infirmaries and field hospitals in the Munich area in the hope of finding some more of the "old men" and bringing them to JV44. In the House of Aviation near Lake Tegern, they found a "gift" in the faces of the already mentioned Walter Krupinski and Gerhard Barkhorn. The first, an ace on the Eastern Front, was one of E. Hartmann's teachers and shot down more than 190 aircraft himself. The second, ace No. 2 in the list of Luftwaffe pilots, had 301 victories to his credit. Both of them decided that they would follow Galland to Munich. Soon a person arrived from Italy, who was very much expected - a speaker from the "rebels" - Lützow. Lützow did not just come - Lützow fled from Italy and achieved a personal meeting with Goering, at which he asked to be sent as an ordinary pilot in JV-44. The company of the three daytime aces was made up of a night fighter pilot, Major Wilhelm Hergit, on his account by this time there were 14 daytime victories, and 57 aircraft shot down at night. The major's last duty station was the Lekfeld test center, and it was from there that Hergit fled to Reim on the Me-262 entrusted to him. This fighter was armed with a long-barreled 50 mm Mauser cannon. Miniature Willy Hergit, known to all Luftwaffe pilots as "der Kleine" - the baby, managed to make several sorties on his unusual plane: one American pilot recalled a meeting in the air with the Messerschmitt, from the fuselage of which a "giant telegraph pole" was sticking out.

On April 17, 1945, nine Me 262 went on a sortie, divided into three links under the command of Galland, Steingoff and Hohagen, respectively. This was probably the largest number of aircraft that the JV44 simultaneously threw into combat. A small group flew to Munich, over which the American bombers were freed from their deadly cargo. The Me-262 pilots waited until the bombers left the anti-aircraft fire zone, and then went on the attack. The Galland troika was the first to launch rockets. Line B-17 was broken. One plane exploded, the surrounding planes, thrown by the shock wave, fell out of formation. At that moment, the second trio of Me-262s launched their missiles. Colonel Steinhoff saw how the last "Schwalbe" of the link hesitated with the missiles, and, having a very high speed compared to the bombers, crashed into one of the "Boeings".

The German fighter literally cut off the high keel with its wing. B-17 spun and began to fall to the ground (the entire crew of Lieutenant B. Harris died in its wreckage). Me-262 without the outer part of the wing followed him. Steinhoff, in the heat of battle, had no time to trace the fate of an unguided fighter. In the second attack, Steinhoff used cannons. He calmly watched as smoke poured from one of the B-17s. Another plane caught fire. Here, American escort fighters fell from above. The German pilots did not let themselves be drawn into the battle, increased their speed and headed towards Riem. They found their airfield in ruins. During their absence, another formation of American bombers worked here thoroughly. However, all the Me-262s landed successfully, after which they were pulled into camouflaged shelters. Eight of the nine aircraft that took off returned. The car of Chief Sergeant E. Schallmoser was missing. It was he who encountered the B-17. After his third ram, no one believed they would see him alive. But on the second day Schallmoser showed up in Riem. He again managed to leave the uncontrolled Me-262 and descend by parachute. In this battle over Munich, German pilots counted six B-17s shot down and two badly damaged. In reality, the Americans lost seven B-17s, including one from anti-aircraft fire.

The next day, JV-44 suffered its first heavy loss. A trio of Me-262s led by Galland and a couple led by Steinhoff went to intercept the bombers. The first three fighters took off safely, and Steinhoff's fighter hit a badly filled funnel with one landing gear wheel. At a speed of about 200 km / h, the left main landing gear broke, then the wing broke, the fighter exploded. No one hoped that Steinhoff would be saved. The burning pilot jumped out of the sea of ​​fire like a devil out of hell. Steinhoff was brought to the hospital, where he met the end of the war.

The five remaining Me 262s attacked a group of B-26s from the 322nd Bombardment Group, shot down one Maruder and damaged another. Data from the other side shows that Steinhoff was not the only JV-44 loss that day. Mustangs from the 325th Fighter Group patrolled near Riem. At 10:50 a.m. Major Johnson spotted a jet fighter taking off. He dived from 3000 m to the ground, and his machine guns hit the Me 262 at the moment the latter was taken off the ground. The German pilot also climbed under fire, simultaneously turning to the left. Johnson held contact and fired in short bursts. Both aircraft reached an altitude of 1000 m when the Me-262 fell back, and the German pilot jumped out with a parachute. The name of the downed pilot is unknown.

"Nightlights" Me 262B-1 of 10./NJG 11 near Berlin

The war continued. On April 19, JV-44 pilots reliably shot down one B-26 and another one - probably. April 20 - seven Maruders were damaged, three were shot down, two of them on account of non-commissioned officer Johann-Karl Müller, in the past the most experienced pilot of the FW-190 fighter-bomber. One "Maruder" "kissed" the "jet rammer" Schallmoser in the next incident. He planted his Me-262 next to the garden of his own house in the vicinity of Munich.

On April 23, the jagdverband unexpectedly replenished with pilots and aircraft. A group of III./EJG-2 headed by Major Heinz Bar flew over from Leckfeld, and I./KG-51 pilots brought their Me-262s from Memmingen. Both groups came under the command of Galland. Now the "staffel" of the lieutenant general consisted of more than 40 combat-ready aircraft (about 80 more Me-262s were under repair or had damage and malfunctions) and more than 90 pilots, with 50 pilots qualified as an instructor.

However, the quantity did not turn into quality, the staffel remained a staffel: there was a kind of "inner circle" of the most productive aces, grouped around Galland and giving the JV-44 a special personality. A very cynical phrase of one of the members of this circle speaks of internal relations in the Jagdverband: "We do not need the emblem of the unit, we already have it - the Knight's Cross." However, aces from aces were not given insurance against death in an air battle.

Günther Lützow, after a three-year break in sorties, was not able to sufficiently master the Me-262; On the morning of April 24, Lützow did not complete the task of intercepting a single B-26, and in the evening paid for his inexperience. Lützow attacked a group of B-26s and was hit by Thunderbolts. An attempt to shake off a pair of American fighters from the tail with a dive turned into a collision with the ground.

The next 72 hours were the last of the JV-44's combat activity. On April 25, the day when Soviet and American troops met on the Elbe, non-commissioned officer Franz Köster shot down P-51 and P-38, thus bringing his combat score with JV-44 to three victories. On April 26, a group of R4M Messerschmitts armed with R4M missiles, led by Galland, intercepted a mixed American-French formation of B-26 Maruder bombers heading for Munich. Four B-26s were shot down in the dogfight. Galland chalked up two Maruders, one was his wingman, non-commissioned officer Schallmoser. Galland's plane, during the attack of the bombers, received damage from the fire of the on-board gunners of the B-26, and now the Thunderbolts of the escort have piled on it. A two-second burst of eight R-47 machine guns pierced the right wing of the Galland fighter, the right Me-262 engine began to smoke. Galland did not lose hope for a successful outcome, he turned the plane around and pulled it home. The lieutenant general landed the damaged car at the airfield right in the midst of a fighter-bomber raid. Wounded in the knee, Galland jumped out of the plane and took cover in a nearby crater. The six-year fighting career of the "first and last" is over. Galland started the war in Poland as a fighter-bomber pilot, and ended up in a crater hiding from fighter-bombers!

After Galland was wounded, Major Heinz Bahr immediately took command of JV-44. Like Herget, Bar flew the Me-262 with unique weapons. At his request, the aircraft was equipped not with four, but with six 30-mm cannons. The day after Galland was wounded, Bahr led Willy Hergit and Franz Köster into battle in his six-gun fighter. A trio of Me-262s attempted to thwart an attack on the Munich-Reim airfield by American fighters. Bar and Köster shot down two Thunderbolts each, Hergit one. In that battle, Hergit flew a conventional Me-262, since the heavy "messer" with a "telegraph pole" was intended to fight bombers and was ill-suited for "dogfight" with fighters.

Constant raids and the rapid advance of units of the 7th American Army made further basing on Munich-Reim impossible. On April 28, JV-44 aircraft flew to Austria, to the Hörchsching airfield, and then on the same day to Salzburg-Maxglan. On landing, the Me-262 came under fire from their own anti-aircraft artillery, fortunately for the pilots, the gunners did not achieve accurate hits.

At the end of the war, JV-44 changed its designation, becoming on paper referred to as IV./JG-7. On April 29, the newly-minted group made a single sortie from McGlan, in which Bar shot down a P-47 on a six-gun Me-262 over Bad Aibling.

A week later, the tanks of the 7th Army again overtook the JV-44 - Salzburg fell on May 4, 1945. At the moment when the Shermans of the 20th Panzer Division appeared on the airfield of the Maxglan airfield Veteran of the Eastern Front, ace with 197 victories, major Walter Krupinski put an end to the history of the yagverband by stuffing hand grenades into the air intakes of serviceable and damaged Me-262s.

NIGHT LIGHTS

In November 1944, only two weeks before the start of JG-7, the formation of another experimental Commando began. In the new connection, it was supposed to test the Me-262 as a night fighter. First of all - "anti Mosquito". The Luftwaffe was never able to find a "medicine" to combat the British high-speed and high-altitude night aircraft. Several staffers of single-engine piston night fighters did not achieve much success in the fight against the Mosquito, now it was decided to rely on the Me-262 jet.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the offer to lead the new "Commando" was received by an experienced ace who had previously flown single-engine fighters. Just a year ago, Lieutenant Kurt Welter was an ordinary flight instructor, but after being transferred to the Reich air defense system, he fully demonstrated his abilities. By September 1944, Welter accounted for three of the seven night Mosquitos shot down by Luftwaffe pilots; in October, Welter received the Knight's Cross, a freshly minted ace shot down 33 aircraft in just 40 sorties. The date of formation of the Commando Welter is November 2, 1944, the first base was the Burg airfield in the vicinity of Magdeburg, while the Commando was armed with only two single-seat Me-262s, one of which was equipped with the FuG-226 Neyling radar.

The first sorties on the night Me-262 Welter performed to patrol the skies of Berlin from the Rechlin-Larz airfield. These were flights that the pilots called "helle Nachtjagd" - a visual night hunt. With this method of interception, fighter pilots acted in close cooperation with searchlights and anti-aircraft artillery. Probably the first Me-262 shot down in a night flight was the Mosquito, which substituted itself under the Welter guns on November 27, 1944.

Oberleutnant Welter won another victory on the night of December 12-13, shooting down a British Lancaster. By New Year's, his small unit had been reinforced with one or two new jet fighters. Kurt Welter, meanwhile, continued to search for pilots adequate to the task assigned to the nightlights. On the night of January 21, 1945, Commando Welther suffered its first loss - Lieutenant Heinz Brückmann crashed during an emergency landing in the Wittstock area, northwest of Berlin; On February 4, two more pilots crashed, one during a flight from one airfield to another, the second - in a training flight.

The end of February found the Welter unit under the operational control of the NJG-11 headquarters, officially the "Commando" of night jet fighters became known as 10./NJG-11, but the pilots themselves preferred the former name. In terms of technical equipment, Welter's forces reached their peak - six single-seat Me-262s and six two-seat Me-262Vs, converted into night fighters at the Messerschmitt factory from training fighters.

The tactic of using double nightlights included pointing the aircraft at the formation of bombers, after which the crew itself had to search for individual targets using the onboard radar. The high speed of the Me-262, which allowed Velter to shoot down three Mosquitos in January, turned out to be unnecessary when attacking four-engine bombers. For a single-seat fighter attacking a target in searchlights, high speed was more of a disadvantage than an advantage. Even the Me-262V, on which the "horns" of the Liechtenstein radar antenna installed in the nose ate about 60 km / h, a bomber loaded with bombs slipped by, while the pilot did not have time to open aimed fire. True, the Bert (Me-262V) crews were able to develop their own tactics that corresponded to the characteristics of their aircraft: they launched an attack from below and extinguished excess speed during climb in the last seconds before opening fire.

In addition to four-engine bombers, there were also Mosquitos, which remained the highest priority targets for single-seat Me-262 pilots. Mosquito raids, usually duplicating heavy bomber raids, were nicknamed "Berlin Express" by the Luftwaffe, and the three most commonly used routes by the British were "Platform 1", "Platform 2" and "Platform 3".

In the last ten days of March 1945, Sergeant Major Karl-Heinz Becker, who opened his account in mid-February (shot down a P-38 Lightning), destroyed six Mosquitos. Here is how he recalled the interception carried out on the night of March 31:

“I took off at 21.29 on March 30 with the task of patrolling in the night sky of Berlin. I established contact with the enemy immediately after takeoff and at an altitude of 8000 m attacked him from the rear hemisphere. The enemy noticed bursts of cannons and turned to the right. I laid a turn and attacked again; the target was on the right, with a slight excess.

I opened fire at the exit of the turn, the hit of shells in the fuselage of the enemy aircraft was clearly observed. The enemy car slid onto the wing and rolled over, all this was clearly visible in the rays of anti-aircraft searchlights. The plane hit the ground at 21:52.

On the same night, Kurt Welter shot down four Mosquitos (only one victory was confirmed after the war, and most likely it was the Mosquito shot down by Becker).

Although the Mosquitos were unarmed aircraft, at least one lost Commando Welter, two-seat Me-262B, can be credited to the "English wooden miracle". Lieutenant Herbert Altner was already a night ace with 21 victories when, in February 1945 He met Welter, who landed at the airfield in Lübeck. Altner was extremely interested in a twin-engine jet fighter. In March, Altner had already joined Welter in Burg. A small retraining course of two circling flights during the day and two at night - and Altner became a Me-262B pilot The shortcomings of such, so to speak, "relearning" were not slow to show.

On one of the last nights of March, Altner flew out to intercept:

“From the ground, we were pointed at the Mosquito group, after which we established stable contact with one of the high-speed Englishmen. I did not slow down, but the silhouette of the Mossy in the sight grid grew much faster than I expected. engines, unintentionally creating all the conditions for a fire. Both engines stalled, my partners and I had no choice but to parachute. My radar operator, Sergeant Major Renhard Lommatz, was unlucky - during the jump he collided with the keel of the Messerschmitt and died already on the ground. "

With the end of the war approaching, the Commando Welther faced all the same problems as other geschwaders: lack of fuel, constant Allied air raids, the approach of the front line to the base. During a daytime raid on the Burg airfield by Allied aircraft, the Commando lost three fighters, and 48 hours later, Soviet troops bypassed Berlin from the west, and the four surviving night Me-262s had to hastily relocate to Lübeck, where they were a little more than a week. During the next raid by Allied bombers, the Me-262B burned down in the damaged hangar.

As a result of the bombing, the Lübeck-Blankensee airfield was completely out of order, fortunately, the Lübeck-Hamburg autobahn passed ten kilometers from the airfield, which they decided to use as a runway. Taking off from this improvised airfield, the pilots overtook the Me-262 to Rekhlin.

In fact, "Commando Welter" has already completely lost its combat capability. Velter himself, the unit's most productive pilot, made his last sortie from the Burg airfield. The pilots completed their last flight to the Schleswig-Jagel airfield on May 7, where they remained in anticipation of the British troops. All surviving Commando Welter aircraft (aka 10./NJG-11), four single-seat Me-262A and two equipped with Me-262B radars, lined up along the runway of the Schleswig-Jagel airfield. Some pilots did not "watch the movie to the end." So, Herbert Altner just got on a motorcycle and drove home.

Three days before Commando Welther's flight to Schleswig to place their planes in the hands of the British, in the far south of Germany, other pilots chose to pelt their Me-262s with hand grenades to prevent the Americans from getting the planes. This was done by the pilots of a unique formation, the ranks of ordinary pilots of which were unprecedented for the Luftwaffe.

…AND SO ON

In addition to the units whose history is described above, there were several more units of Me-262 jet fighters. Among them were the "Industriesshutsstaffeln" - industrial protection squadrons. As follows from the title name, these units were small formations at aircraft factories, designed to defend enterprises. Most of the "Industriesshutsstaffeln" were named after the names of their companies, and factory test pilots acted as fighter pilots. Two such formations, each of six Me-262s, were created at a higher official level. They received the designations ISS-1 and ISS-2 and were intended for the defense of the assembly plants in Lepheim and Schwabisch, respectively, and the personnel were recruited mainly from the Luftwaffe. AT operational plan both formations were under the command of the 7th Fighter Division. ISS-1 and ISS-2 were formed in January 1945, in early February they merged into larger units - JG-7 and JV-44.

There were several "nominal" formations of the "Gefestsverband (combat unit) Hogebak" type, recruited from the remnants of various groups for protection in last days war airfield Prague-Rizhen. In the experimental "Commando Glandenbeck" in January 1945, there was only one Me-262 out of five, then based at the Parchim airfield.

Very little is known about the combat activities of all these formations; probably, their pilots won a total of about 50 victories.

ONLY ONE AC

As mentioned earlier, for the accelerated training of pilots for jet aircraft in September 1944 in Leckfeld, on the basis of the test team "262", group III / EJG 2 was formed. This unit became widely known in early 1945, when the Luftwaffe command decided speed up the arming of fighter units with Me 262 aircraft.

III / EJG2 was based at the airfield in Leckfeld, fighter and bomber pilots began to arrive there. There was only one order: "Learn to fly jet fighters as soon as possible!" Accordingly, the course was built. First, 20 hours of flying Bf 110 and Me 410 with one engine off, which prepared for future difficulties with the Me 262. Actually, familiarization with the Schwalbe included eight flights with a total duration of 7 hours: an hour in a circle over the airfield, two hours of piloting, an hour flying over the terrain (navigation training), an hour of high-altitude flights and two hours - to develop skills in flying in the ranks. At the end - flight with shooting. This was the end of the training, everything else the freshly baked "reactive" finished his education in the combat unit, if he had time. Severe uncles, the pilots of the Mustangs, interfered too often in the learning process. They did not forgive mistakes, and "retaking the exam" was excluded due to wartime. Erich Hartmann was among the chosen ones and recalled the time of his studies in this way:

The Americans attacked the airfield every morning. Flights could begin only after the runway was repaired, at about 10.30. They flew for an hour and a half, then by noon allied fighters appeared and attacked from a dive. R-47s flew in behind them, dropping five tons of explosives at a time. At night, the typical sound of the Merlin engines was heard, which meant that the Mosquito visited us. RAF planes swooped down, firing at anything that glowed on and around the airfield.

It was very difficult to carry out even a minimal training program at the beginning of 1945. There were very few double-seat Me-262Vs, so some experienced front-line pilots, after listening to a theoretical course, immediately began flying single-seat combat vehicles.

The work of III/EJG 2 is by no means easy. In February 1945, the famous ace Heinz Bahr took command of the unit. The bar combined the training of pilots with participation in tests that took place in the Leckfeld branch of the Messerschmitt company. Bar flew the Me-262 several times a day, so it is not surprising that he achieved mastery in flying a jet fighter, which made it possible to achieve high combat results. Unfortunately, now it is no longer possible to find out exactly what tests Bar participated in (about 80-90 flights made by him on experimental machines are not recorded in his flight book). He flew with external tanks, with R4M missiles, on aircraft with combined weapons (Me 262A-1a and Me 262A-la / U5). I found documentary evidence of his flight on the Me-262S-1 ("Heimatschutzer I"). Bar flew on it on February 15, 1945, reaching the highest figures ever measured on the Me 262 - a speed of 1040 km / h and an altitude of 14,700 m. It seemed to the restless Bar that training and test flights were not enough: he again began to perform combat flights. His first known sortie took place on March 2, 1945. As wingman, Bar took the old comrade Leo Schumacher, who also fell into III / EJG 2. Schumacher flew as wingman for Bar back in JG-1. Bar won his first victory on the Me 262 on 19 April. The Mustang that turned up Bar had to be attacked twice, since the weapon failed in the first run. The failure was eliminated, the Bar returned, and from the right combat turn opened fire from all four Mk 108s. As observers saw, the R-51 lost altitude and fell. This Mustang was Bar's first "jet" victory, followed by others. In total, Bar is credited with 16-19 jet victories.

On March 19, 1945, Bar carried out an air battle on Me 262A-1 (manufacturer number 110559) with a red number "13" on the fuselage. Schumacher flew the Me 262A-1 with the designation "23" in red. Most of Bar's fighters had tail number "13". German pilots believed in lucky numbers.

I must say, the number "13" for the Bar really became lucky. On March 21, 1945, the tanks of the American Liberator exploded from the shells of his fighter, and the bomber fell to the ground in flames. Three days later, on March 24, he shot down a Mustang and a Liberator over Stuttgart. The ace's tail was once again covered by the old wingman Schumacher.

On 27 March the airfield at Löckfeld was visited by Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Dahl (128 victories in the war), the new day fighter inspector. After getting acquainted with the activities of the unit, Dahl expressed a desire to fly with III / EJG2 pilots on a combat mission. Dahl took off with Bar and several other pilots on the Me 262. After the battle, Dahl claimed two P-47 Thunderbolts shot down (126th and 127th victories). Bar reported three, and Sergeant Rauchensteiner one P-47 shot down by them. However, on that day, the USAAF lost only one P-47 from the 367th Fighter Group in air battles, another Thunderbolt fell into the English Channel for unknown reasons. On April 4, Bar reported one Mustang shot down by him. On April 9, 1945, he took off to intercept a formation that included 40 B-26s from the 387th bomber group, which were going to bomb military depots in the Amberg-Kummersbrück area. According to the stories of American pilots, they were attacked by a pair of Me-262s, which shot down one B-26, and another Maruder was seriously damaged. One "Schwalbe" also received damage from the fire of the onboard gunners and flared up. Baru had two B-26s on his personal combat account that day. On April 12, Bar announced the destruction of another B-26, and on April 18, two Thunderbolts.

After the war, the allies interrogated Bar to find out his opinion about the Me-262:

“When we switched to the Me 262, we felt completely different, we gained an advantage over all the Allied fighters. The jet aircraft was superior to any piston aircraft. We could take the fight, or we could avoid it. We made a decision. in a dogfight, though all these advantages only work if both engines are running reliably.The biggest problem for us was the Allied fighters, which took us home and shot us over the airfield when we landed.

Me 262 Heinz Bahr

End of story...

Bar knew exactly what he was talking about. And once again, he demonstrated the advantages of jet technology over piston technology (as well as the level of his skill) on April 19, when he shot down two Mustangs. On this day, the USAAF did report the loss of two Mustangs: one from the 354th Fighter Group and one from the 364th Fighter Group. The bar flew that day on the plane head. No. 110559 with tail number "13" in red. These were the ace's last victories with III/EJG 2.

The combat use of the Me-262 was undoubtedly successful. The aircraft demonstrated an advantage over all Allied aircraft, but several hundred jet fighters could neither significantly affect the results of the war in the air, nor stop the advance of the enemy troops. The end of the "Third Reich" was inevitably approaching.

Lekfeld was evacuated on April 23 directly in front of the advancing units of the American army. Bar, along with other III / EJG 2 pilots, overtook all serviceable Me-262s to Munich-Reim, where Adolf Galland's JV-44 unit was based. Together with the Me-262, several He-162s from Erprpobungskommando-162 flew to Munich, which in the second half of April was also transferred to Lenkfeld from Rechlin. It is often believed in the literature that Bar led this kommando in Rechlin, but this is a mistake; he was the commander of III / EJG 2, and commanded the He-162 unit only at the time of its arrival in Leckfeld.

Pilots from III / EJG-2 reinforced JV 44 in time. As mentioned above, at the end of April this unit lost Colonel Johann Steinhoff, Major Barkhorn, Colonel Gunther Lützow and Galland himself. Bar took command of JV-44.

At the end of April 1945, there was no doubt that the end was near. There was nothing left, no fuel, no spare parts, no orders. But, oddly enough, there were enough Me-262s - they were transferred to JV-44 from disbanded units. On April 28, the pilots of Bar won the only victory in aerial combat in a day in a JV-44 - a P-47 became their victim. On April 29, JV-44 pilots made their last combat sortie in the history of the unit, and Bar scored his last victory in a dogfight. Over Bad Albingen, he shot down the Mosquito, the 221st downed (according to Bar's own calculations) aircraft.

In the JV-44, Bar flew various Me 262A-1s. There are references to several victories won by Bar on the Me 262A1 a / U 1. An aircraft with this designation really existed, instead of the usual four Mk 1Q8, it had six different types in front: four MG 151 / 20 and two Mk 103. Bar claimed that on such a Me 262 attacked the Mosquito in JV 44. However, Bar's six-gun Messer was already mentioned above. The combined armament did not justify itself, it was dismantled, and the aircraft was returned to its original form.

In the last days of April 1945, JV 44 flew to the Austrian Salzburg. There, on May 5, the personnel received an order to relocate to the Prague area and join JG-7 as Group IV. However, this order was not carried out. Salzburg surrendered to the Allied forces. When American tanks began to approach the airfield, Heinz Bahr gave his last order: "Fire the Me-262!" The ace met the end of the war in American captivity. During the war, Heinz Bahr made about 1000 sorties, shot down 96 aircraft on the Eastern Front, he won the rest of the victories in battles with the aircraft of the Western Allies. Flying the Me 262, he chalked up 16 confirmed victories. Among the planes shot down by Bar were 22 American four-engine bombers. Bar himself was shot down 18 times, 4 times the ace jumped with a parachute.

The Americans were well aware of what pilots they managed to capture. In general, the Me-262 pilots were quoted very highly by the winners. After several preliminary interrogations, all JV-44 officers were loaded into a transport aircraft and taken to England. They were placed in a special camp number 7 in Bovington. Most of the questions concerned the Me-262. The bar and the rest told. It no longer made sense to lock up: the war was lost, the Allies captured a significant number of serviceable Me-262s. The regime in the camp was quite free. Everything changed when the prisoners were "squeezed out". The pilots were sent to the continent, to an ordinary prisoner of war camp. There conditions were much worse. Bar was released in mid-1947. His return to civilian life was not easy. For a long time the veteran could not find a job. From the former "legend of the Third Reich" employers shied away in horror. The bar went through many nondescript works, until in 1950 he had a chance. The most experienced fighter pilot was taken as a pilot in a small private flying club. On April 28, 1957, Bar demonstrated aerobatics in a light sport aircraft in Braunschweig. Suddenly, the plane went into a tailspin at an altitude of 50 m. The best jet ace of the Second World War, in front of his family, died in the wreckage of the plane

The high-speed turbojet fighter-interceptor Messerschmitt ME-262 Schwalbe ("Messerschmitt ME-262 Swallow") appeared on the battlefield only in 1944. It is impossible to say exactly what kind of work this machine was intended for. Experiments with the aircraft continued even on the battlefield. He served as a fighter (including night), bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. The car was single and double, combat and training. It installed the latest blind landing system, experimental radar equipment, tested sights, guns of various calibers, and much other experimental equipment. The German industry produced about 25 modifications of this aircraft.

"Messerschmitt-262" was the world's first serial jet machine, which took a direct part in the hostilities. The Germans called him "Swallow" (Schwalbe), the Americans and the British - "Petrel" (Petrel). Until the end of the war, 1433 cars were produced by German industry. Thus, the Messerschmitt ME-262 can be considered the most massive

The history of the creation of the aircraft

Perhaps, none of the aircraft models has undergone so many difficulties in the process of its formation as the Messerschmitt-262. The history of the creation of this machine, its development and bringing to mass production was complicated not only by bureaucratic delays and insufficient funding, but also by many technological problems.

As reported by the Minister of Armaments of Germany, this aircraft made its first flight a month before the attack of German troops on the USSR. In the first model ME-262, piston engines were also used. However, they were not powerful enough. The very next year, it was decided to use Jumo-004, which was developed and started to be produced by Junkers.

Many facts are known in history when future innovations nullified the entire value of the weapons of the previous generation. "Messerschmitt-262" can be considered one of those. The advantage of the new machine over enemy aircraft was obvious, but the childhood illnesses of the German economy became an insurmountable obstacle to its mass production.

The main problems that have plagued the development of the aircraft throughout its history include: firstly, the unreliability of the Jumo turbojet engines that the Messerschmitt-262 was equipped with. They worked very unreliably in a rarefied atmosphere and required a long and careful revision. Secondly, the tires mounted on the wheels of the chassis also did not differ in quality. They often burst during landing, although the speed of the landing aircraft was only 190 km / h. Together with the difficult military-political situation in Germany and the indecision of the higher command in the construction of new aircraft, these circumstances led to the fact that the Messerschmitt ME-262 (photo above) appeared on the battlefield only in the second half of 1944, with a six-month delay . It failed to become the miracle weapon that Adolf Hitler hoped would help Germany regain dominance of European airspace. But it could very well have happened.

When all the shortcomings were eliminated, it became clear to the German designers that all the flight performance of the new machine left far behind the parameters of the Allied aircraft. The Messerschmitt-262 aircraft built by them could be safely considered a masterpiece of the domestic aircraft industry.

Description

The latest model of the Messerschmitt-262 aircraft, whose design did not yet resemble jet engines of modern times, was equipped with two turbojet engines and forward-swept wings. The maximum speed of movement was almost 850 km / h. He gained a height of 9,000 meters in 7 minutes. The maximum flight altitude was 11,000 meters. Of the weapons, four 30-mm MK-108 cannons should be noted, each shell of which could easily bring down a heavy bomber. They were arranged in pairs in each of the wings, one above the other. It was also possible to install up to 12 unguided rockets.

The reaction of the allies to the appearance of "Messerschmitt-262"

The Allies, who had densely occupied the European skies, were shocked by the appearance of the ME-262. Most of all, this surprise did not please those accustomed to making unpunished daytime raids on German cities and military installations. It seemed that a little more and all the advantage in the air would be lost.

But Adolf Hitler unexpectedly came to the aid of the Anglo-Americans. The fact is that initially the Germans successfully used the Messerschmitt-262 jet as an interceptor fighter. The Fuhrer insistently demanded that this aircraft be used as a high-speed bomber capable of disrupting the appearance of the allies on the European stage of hostilities, ignoring the opposition of fighters.

German pilots about a new generation car

In 1943 try out new car came to mind personally to the commander of the Luftwaffe fighter aircraft, General Adolf Galland. He expressed his impressions in a short phrase: "This car flies like angels carry it." According to another pilot, Jörg Scypionski, the Messerschmitt-262 (whose photo is contained in the article) was not particularly difficult to manage. The main thing is to do everything according to the instructions, then the car will behave quietly and will not be capricious. Due to the unusually high speed, the main thing in the battle was to have time to catch the enemy aircraft in sight. In this case, the pilot became the king of the situation.

The armament of the aircraft was so powerful that one volley was enough for everything to be over. Nevertheless, even experienced pilots were not so easy to cope with this obstinate machine. An indispensable retraining was required, which required a lot of time.

Fighter unit "Yagdferband 744 (J744)"

One of the categorical opponents of the decision of Hitler and Goering to use the Messerschmitt-262 fighter as a bomber was the commander of the Luftwaffe fighter aircraft, a veteran of the Battle of England, Adolf Galland. In January 1945, during a meeting attended by the entire leadership of Germany's aviation, he publicly expressed doubts about Goering's competence as commander of the country's air fleet. As a result, the obstinate general was removed from his post. However, he did not give up.

To prove his case, Galland offered to form a special formation under his command, equipping it with Messerschmitt ME-262 aircraft. Among others, Gerhard Barhorn (at that time he had 301 air victories), Heinz Baer (220 victories), Walter Krupinski (197 victories), Johannes Steinhoff (176 victories), Günter Lützow (108 victories) and etc. The connection was named "Fighter unit" Jagdverband 744 (J744) ".

Short biography "Jagdverband 744 (J744)"

In March 1945, the headquarters of the new formation was located at the Munich-Riem airfield, from where it began to intercept armadas of Allied bombers that made daylight raids on Germany. For a little over a month, this newly-minted elite air unit already had 45 downed allied aircraft. However, this did not last long. May 3, 1945 she was defeated by the Allies in Salzburg.

Adolf Galland himself also did not refuse the helm of the aircraft. He took part in many operations to intercept Allied bomber raids. On April 25, during one of them, he was shot down by an American Republic R-47 cover fighter. The pilot was wounded in both knees and was unable to properly land his fighter on a field pitted with craters.

German pilot victories

The first victory behind the wheel of a jet Messerschmitt-262 was won by Adolf Schreiber. This event took place on June 26, 1944. In addition to the above pilots, Messerschmitt-262 helped Franz Schall become famous - on the ME-262 he won 14 victories (137 in total), Herman Buchner - 12 (58), Georg Peter Eder - 12 (78), Erich Rudorffer - 12 (222) , Karl Schnorrer - 11 (46), Johannes Steinhoff - 6 (176), Walter Novotny (248 victories in total), etc.

German pilots considered the Messerschmitt-262 so invulnerable that they boldly entered into battles with an enemy many times superior in number. So, on March 19, 1945, 28 German pilots, being at the controls of the Meserschmitt-262, were not afraid to engage in battle with a huge cloud of American aircraft, consisting of 1300 bombers and 750 cover fighters. Despite their small numbers, they managed to disperse this entire armada, preventing a raid on one of the German facilities.

How the Allies fought the ME-262

In a direct confrontation with the Messerschmitt-262, any Allied aircraft was doomed to defeat. Losing to him in speed, maneuver and power of weapons, one could not even dream of victory. And yet the Achilles' heel was found. Not even alone. The fact is that the Messerschmitt-262 jet fighter turned out to be very vulnerable during takeoff and landing. At these moments, it was decided to bet in the confrontation with him.

First of all, all the forces were thrown into reconnaissance of the airfields on which the German Lastochkas were based. After that, their airstrip was subjected to merciless bombing. It was mixed with the earth almost daily. This continued until the Messerschmitts-262, based at the airfield, were transported to another place.

There are also several facts of the destruction of the "Messers" on takeoff. So, on October 7, 1944, Lieutenant Urban Drew, flying through enemy territory, noticed a pair of jet aircraft starting from the airfield. Using the advantage in height and speed, the pilot boldly attacked the opponents and shot down both of them, preventing them from picking up speed.

Several ME-262s were also destroyed in air battles. So, on November 8, 1944, one of the Luftwaffe aces, who had previously shot down 258 enemy aircraft, was shot down by one of the Mustang R-51 fighters covering him during an attack by an American bomber formation.

Characteristics of "Messerschmitt-262"

The length of the aircraft was 10.6 m, height - 3.8 m, wingspan - 12.5 m, wing area - 21.8 m. Empty weight was 3800 kg, normal takeoff weight - 6400 kg, maximum takeoff weight - 7140 kg. The practical lifting ceiling was 11 km. The maximum speed at maximum altitude was 855 km / h. It was armed with 4 MK-108 guns. It was also possible to install 12 R4M unguided rockets.

The winners of jet "Messerschmitt-262": allies

There are not so many winners of jet Messerschmitts among the allies. For the most part, the German "swallows" were destroyed at the airfields, not giving them the opportunity to rise. Nevertheless, the downed Messerschmitt-262s were credited to Captain J. Bendrault (386th FS), Lieutenant Muller (353rd FG), Major Z. Connor (78th FG), pilot-officer Bob Cole ( 3rd Squadron RAF), Lieutenant Lamb (78th FG), Lieutenant Wilson (401st Canadian Air Squadron), etc.

The winners of the jet "Messerschmitt-262": Eastern Front

In addition to the Western European theater of operations, Messerschmitts-262 also appeared on the Eastern Front. True, information about this is rather scarce. Nevertheless, the list of winners of the Messerschmitt-262 includes the names of Soviet aces. Ivan Kozhedub, Lev Sivko, Ivan Kuznetsov, Yakov Okolepov and Alexander Dolgunov have officially registered shot down jet "Messers" on their account. Presumably, two more names should be included in this list: Garry Merkviladze, a pilot of the 152nd Guards Aviation Regiment, and Vladimir Yegorovich from the 402nd Fighter Aviation Regiment.

However, no evidence of their victories has been found in the archives.

Conclusion

During the entire period of the Second World War, 1433 Messerschmitt-262 aircraft were built and sent to the front, including its various modifications. However, not all vehicles took part in hostilities. The lack of fuel, the lack of qualified personnel and the shortage of airfields suitable for basing (the car needed an extended runway) played an important role in the fate of the world's first jet aircraft, the Messerschmitt ME-262. And yet he left a noticeable mark in the history of world aviation. After all, its appearance marked the beginning of the era of jet aviation.

While the issue of launching the Me 262 into the series was being resolved, Messerschmitt, lacking experienced aircraft, used everything he had to fine-tune the Me 262: an ejection seat and pressurized cabin for the Me 262, Bf 109 V23, previously used under the Me 309 program, were tested on the Me 309 V3 , was tested with the nose landing gear. The latter in a fixed position was further installed on the Me 262 V5 (PC + UE), first flown on June 26, 1943. The Me 262 VI was converted for two Jumo 004A engines, the piston engine was removed from the bow, but soon after the start of its testing one of the engines failed, and the aircraft was seriously damaged during an emergency landing.

The first flights and landings of the Me 262 V5 equipped with a non-retractable nose wheel were disappointing - the aircraft required the same takeoff run as with a conventional tail wheel. It was decided to test the Borzig launch rocket boosters on the plane, which gave a thrust of 500 kg for six seconds. They were mounted under the fuselage just behind the center of gravity. The first start with them was carried out by Karl Baur. After the takeoff, at a speed of 160 km / h, Baur turned on the rockets. The nose wheel immediately lifted off the runway, and the pilot was forced to pull the stick all the way away from himself to avoid lift-off of the aircraft at a slower than normal takeoff speed. Baur did not allow the plane to take off until the boosters worked, and managed to get off the ground before the end of the runway. In subsequent flights, the point of application of the thrust of the accelerators was changed, which brought success - the takeoff of the aircraft was reduced by 200-300 m, and using a pair of accelerators with a thrust of 1000 kg, the Me 262 required only 400 m for takeoff.

In early November, the first aircraft of the pilot batch Me 262 V6 began flying. It was noticeably different from previous aircraft. Jumo 004B-1 engines were put on it, weighing 90 kg less than 004A-1, but giving 900 kg of thrust each. Like the Me 262V5, the engines were placed in new nacelles with less aerodynamic drag. The elevator received an external balancer. Cannon ports were cut in the nose, although no armament was placed. The most important difference was the fully retractable nose landing gear. The landing gear was retracted hydraulically, but the nose wheel was released using compressed air. Also, its doors were opened. The main landing gear simply fell out under the influence of gravity, so the plane had to be "shaken" more so that the landing gear would lock into place. The first flights on the Me 262 V6 were conducted by Gerd Lindner. The possibility of using the nose wheel as an air brake was considered. During the first flights, the rack was released at a speed of 550 km / h, but this affected the handling so much that a speed limit was imposed on its release - no more than 500 km / h.

Me 262 V5 equipped with a fixed nose landing gear and protective nets on the engine air intakes

Retractable nose landing gear Me 262 V6

It should be noted that when creating the nose landing gear, German designers, like their foreign colleagues, encountered the so-called shimmy phenomenon - a wobble of a self-orienting wheel, leading to strong shaking and even destruction of the structure. Usually, hydraulic shimmy dampers were installed on aircraft to dampen such vibrations. However, the Germans used a friction damper on the Me 262. By design, it turned out to be very simple, but it had one drawback - it did not provide a free return of the wheel to the middle position, since the friction force acts constantly. As a result, it was difficult for the pilot to maintain a given direction.

Already after the war, the pilots of the Air Force Research Institute, who tested the Me 262, noted that the aircraft had a tendency to turn around at the beginning of the run. They were forced to eliminate this by slowing down the corresponding wheel, and only after a run of 100-150 m did the nose wheel hold the given direction well.

For the same reason, when turning the aircraft on taxiing, the pilot had to maintain a large radius, otherwise the wheel would lose direction and not provide the aircraft with a straight line.

During November 1943, the second unarmed pre-production aircraft, the Me 262 V7, was completed. Its cockpit was pressurized and withstood a "1:2" difference (that is, at an altitude of 12,000 m, the pressure in the cockpit was equivalent to 6,000 m).

Me 262 V6 prepared for demonstration on 26 November 1943 in front of Hitler and Goering in Insterburg. Although the test program was of the utmost importance, the Me 262 V4 was also retired for this demonstration. They were sent to Insterburg along with pilots Karl Baur and Gerd Lindner. On the Me 262 V4, under the control of Baur, the engines stalled on takeoff, but Lindner on the Me 262 V6 successfully conducted a demonstration flight. Subsequently, it was alleged that after this demonstration, Hitler demanded not only to equip the Me 262 with bombs (it was quite possible), but also to turn it into a "blitz bomber" - a real high-speed bomber, and not a dual-purpose aircraft!

Hermann Goering (in a white raincoat) inspects jet equipment (Me 262 V6)

However, there is no evidence for this, but there is a telegram from Goering dated December 5, 1943, in which Hitler's judgments about the Luftwaffe were noted. There was the following: "The Führer expressed particular attention to the urgent need for the production of jet aircraft in the fighter-bomber version. It is extremely important to keep in mind that the Luftwaffe will receive the necessary number of such aircraft to start using them by the spring of 1944. All problems with manpower and materials must be dealt with at the expense of the Luftwaffe reserves, for which the existing stocks must be expanded. The Führer feels that any delay is a manifestation of criminal irresponsibility. The Führer has demanded regular reports on the status of Me 262 and Ag 234." This message clearly indicates that Hitler saw the Me 262 as a fighter-bomber.

Me 262 V9, upgraded under the high-speed flight program. Note the well streamlined cockpit canopy.

Armaments Minister Albert Speer gave the Me 262 program the highest priority, but the aircraft was still far from entering service. Numerous problems had to be solved. The development of production proceeded with great difficulties. Qualified workers were sent to make up for losses on the Eastern Front. It was necessary to disperse production, and this, in turn, placed an additional burden on the provision of resources. Since the military situation did not allow any delay in the operation of the assembly lines, for the possible development of the Me 262, it was decided instead of using a dispersed production system to reconstruct the Messerschmitt A.G. plant. in Kottern. Speer promised 1,800 skilled workers for this plant, but as it turned out, most of those who arrived did not know how to do anything at all. Otto Saur gave the Gauleiter of Thuringia Fritz Sauckel the idea of ​​using mines in Calais and Kammsdorf for the production of the fighter. The planes were supposed to go up from the mine on special lifts, and then immediately take off from adjacent airfields. Sauckel promised to start production in March 1945, and by the end of the year to bring deliveries to 1000 aircraft per month. His influence was such that he was able to obtain for himself a part of the manpower, materials and equipment planned for the organization of production in Kottern. The Sauckel complex was supposed to be the largest underground production in Germany, but not a single aircraft was delivered from it until the end of the war.

The problem was not only the release of Me 262 airframes, but also the release of Jumo 004B engines. Director of "Junkers" and a member of the commission for the production of Me 262 Cambeis stood against the deployment mass production Jumo 004, since the engine had not yet been finished, and its reliability left much to be desired. Despite having good facilities for testing and manufacturing the engine, deliveries from the Junkers Jumo 004B were negligible until June 1944, when, despite a bunch of unresolved problems, the Junkers engine was nevertheless put into production by a strong-willed decision. The situation was complicated by the lack of capacity for mass production. The assembly of Jumo 004 was established in the tunnels near Nordhausen, but the main problem was the lack of nickel and chromium for the manufacture of compressor blades. The Jumo 004B compressor had ten stages with 40 blades each. Due to the lack of high-quality raw materials, turbine and compressor blades often could not withstand intense operating conditions. This led to engine failures or to its destruction. The pressure in front of the turbine at moderate speeds and high altitudes often dropped sharply, and it was very difficult to regulate the fuel supply. As a result of an excess of fuel, the engine immediately caught fire, and when it was lacking, it stalled.

In December 1943, the production of two more pre-production aircraft began, which later received numbers - Me 262 V8 and Me 262 V10. The V8 had a new cockpit canopy and was the first to receive armament, consisting of four 30 mm Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108 cannons with an electro-pneumatic reloading system and an electric trigger. The guns were in the nose of the aircraft. Aiming was carried out using the Revy 16V sight. This arrangement of guns was considered ideal from a ballistic point of view, but some difficulties arose during testing. So, often there was a break in the tapes of ammunition. This problem was solved by changing the mechanism of the tape drive. The guns were zeroed in at 400-500 m. The upper pair had 100 rounds of ammunition per barrel, and the lower pair - 80.

Me 262 V10 was intended for testing in order to reduce the load on the control stick. As soon as the tests of the experimental machines reached high speeds, the load on the control stick reached an unacceptable value. To reduce the load, they experimented with ailerons - they increased and decreased the thickness of the profile. All unsuccessful. Then the leading edge, the aileron was made more blunt, and the suspension hinge was moved back, the gap between the wing and the aileron was changed, a trimmer was installed, but even after all this, the loads at high speeds were high. As a result, a "load change mechanism" was installed on the Me 262 control stick, adjusting the force application lever if the pilot needed to make sharp maneuvers at high speeds. The control stick was inserted into a metal sleeve, in which it could move up and down, thereby changing the load. The handle was fixed in the sleeve with a side screw at the cabin floor level. With the help of the steering wheel on the side of the sleeve, it was possible to raise and lower the control handle. Thus, the leverage for applying force increased, but being fully extended, the handle rested against the side of the cockpit, reducing the range of aileron deflection from 22 to 18 °. In addition, a new canopy was tested on the Me 262 V10 with the windshield mounted at an angle of 25°. However, due to the deterioration of visibility on serial machines, this innovation did not take root.

Me 262 V9 was ready in January 1944. Radio and other equipment were to be tested on it. Me 262 V11 and Me 262 V12 were used to study aerodynamics. The Me 262 V9 was subsequently used for research at critical Mach numbers. During testing, the aircraft received a number of aerodynamic improvements, such as a new canopy with less air resistance. On July 6, 1944, this plane reached a speed of 1000 km/h in a gentle descent.

In January and February 1944, the remaining 23 pre-production aircraft, laid down under the original contract for the Me 262A-0, were almost completed, but there were not enough engines for them. The Ag 234 bomber competed with the Me 262 for these engines. Even if the pre-production aircraft were finished six months earlier, they would also have been waiting for the engines. So, if Milch had been less cautious at the beginning of the Me 262 program, it is unlikely that this has accelerated the progress of work.

Sixteen pre-production Me 262A-0 fighters were accepted by the Luftwaffe in April 1944, and the rest - in next month. Some of them entered the test center in Rechlin, and the majority - in the test team "262", which was formed on the basis of 15 aircraft under the command of Captain Thirfelder at the Leckfeld airfield. There, tactics of use were practiced and jet pilots were trained.

The Fighter Headquarters, founded on March 1, 1944 under the leadership of Otto Saur, made every effort to expand the production of the Me 262. But these "floundering" of Saur only infuriated the Junkers management, which was still bringing the Jumo 004B engine to mass production. As for Hitler, when, at a meeting with Göring, Milch and Saur the following month, he learned that not a single Me 262 had been delivered with bomb racks, he flew into a rage. "None of my orders were carried out!" shouted Hitler. It was useless for the Fuhrer to explain that the aircraft already delivered were actually still experimental, and the tests of various bomb racks were already underway. However, Milch still reacted vividly, declaring that the Me 262 was designed as a fighter, not a bomber. This remark did not affect Hitler's opinion and only reflected in the fall of Milch's "shares".

Although the aircraft manufacturers actually ignored Hitler's instructions, in reality, during the first months of 1944, active work was carried out to equip the fighter with bombs suspended both on ordinary and rather non-standard holders. The first provided for the installation of two ETC 504 ventral bomb racks for one 1000-kg bomb or two 250-500-kg bombs. Usually, a load of one 500-kg or two 250-kg bombs was used.

A non-standard approach to the problem involved the use of a variant with towing a 500-1000-kg bomb on a rigid beam 7 m long. The tug was attached under the tail of the Me 262 on a cardan joint. Through the pipe of the tug there was electrical wiring to the explosive bolts, which ensured the separation of the bomb and the simultaneous shooting of the wings on the latter. To take off, a cart was attached to the bomb, which was also separated after being lifted off the ground with the help of explosive bolts. The use of such a bomb required the pilot to aim through the Revy in a shallow dive. The first bomb tug was the Me 262 V10. The tests were carried out by Gerd Lindner. With the bomb in tow, the speed of the Me 262 was reduced to 510-530 km/h. Flights with a 500-kg bomb were successful. But there were difficulties with towing a 1000-kg bomb, since the auxiliary wing of the bomb turned out to be too large, which affected the behavior of the aircraft. During one of the flights, Lindner was forced to leave the plane, as it became completely uncontrollable. The tests were continued on the pre-production Me 262A-0. One day the explosive bolts releasing the bomb failed and Lindner was forced to land with the bomb in tow. On another occasion, the hinge of the tug mount generally flew off during a sharp maneuver. In the end, they agreed that towing a bomb was too risky and settled on more traditional options.

Me 262 (V303) modified for 1000 kg bomb

500 kg bomb on holder for Me 262

Me 262 V10 with a 500 kg bomb in tow

Me 262 V10 with 500 kg and 1000 kg towed bombs

On May 29, just after the Obersalzberg conference ended, Goering spoke with Messerschmitt, Generals Bodenschatze, Galland and Korten, and Lieutenant Colonel Petersen about the Me 262. Goering said: "To avoid any misunderstandings, I suppose to use only the term" high-speed bomber ", and not a "fighter-bomber". Accordingly, control over the work on the aircraft passes to the commander of bomber aviation." Especially for Galland, Goering explained: “This does not mean that the Fuhrer considers the aircraft only as a bomber. He expects a lot from the aircraft and as a fighter and is not going to produce only a bomber. The Fuhrer only wants to be resolved issues related to the suspension of bombs, bombing and aiming mechanism, as well as the development of bombing tactics. When Messerschmitt inadvertently called the Me 262 a fighter in a further conversation, Goering immediately demanded that the use of this term be stopped. Goering did not want to risk his reputation with Hitler, and ended the discussion with the words: "Everything that the Fuhrer orders must be carried out unquestioningly!"

At a brief meeting between Hitler and Saur on June 7, 1944, the former confirmed his demands. The "leader's will", which, as it was later claimed, affected the fate of the Me 262, consisted in the requirement that the first batches of the aircraft be produced exclusively in the bomber version. Refinement of the fighter version was allowed, but it was stated: "... the release of the bomber should not depend on these tests, but until they are fully completed, the fighter should not be put into production. After that, nothing will prevent the bomber and fighter from being produced in parallel."

How did the "will of the Fuhrer" really affect the fate of Me 262? According to various estimates, the conversion of the Me 262 into a bomber delayed the entry of the aircraft into service for a period of four weeks to six months. But it should be noted that almost all the work on converting the aircraft into a bomber was carried out even before Hitler's order (a place was allocated for bomb release mechanisms and various bomb racks were tested). These modifications were relatively simple and could be done right on the assembly line. In reality, the delivery of the aircraft was held back by only one factor - the unavailability of the turbojet engine.

With the decision to put the Jumo 004B into production in June 1944, deliveries of engines for the Me 262 immediately reached significant levels. In the same month, the Luftwaffe took delivery of the first 28 production Me 262s. The next month, deliveries doubled with 58 aircraft accepted, but fell to 15 in August as there were not enough engines. In September, the situation improved - the assembly lines handed over 94 Me 262s, and in October - 118. As a result, by November, when Hitler's order was canceled, the Luftwaffe received 313 aircraft.

At a meeting of the "destroyer headquarters" on June 22, 1944, Otto Saur told his colleagues: "... we deserved a serious censure. In September-October of last year, we made a number of promises based only on our wishes, and not on facts. We expected that in January-February 1944 we will have a sufficient number of experimental Me 262s to complete the tests, we expected the production of 30-40 aircraft in March, 60 in May and further 75-80 aircraft per month. one [combat] aircraft. We must blame ourselves - we could not find the necessary resources, we could not concentrate our efforts, we could not focus on solving the problems that arose and insist on the importance of the work. The development and production of the Me 262 fell victim to malicious intrigues - they should be immediately stop! I won't let myself be made a liar again!" Of course, there were no "malicious intrigues" - that would be too simple. The reasons were more obvious, but Zaur did not have any technical background to appreciate all the problems. At this meeting in the "fighter headquarters" new plans were set: the release of 60 aircraft in July, 100 in August, 150 in September, 225 in October, 325 in November and 500 in December. In reality, these figures were not achieved. Until the end of the year, only 568 Me 262s were delivered instead of 1360 according to the plan.

A month after taking office as head of the Luftwaffe headquarters, Lieutenant General Werner Kreipe made attempts to convey to Hitler the importance of strengthening the Reich's air defense through the use of Me 262 and, therefore, canceling the order for the priority release of the bomber version. On August 30, he managed to get some concessions from Hitler - every 20th Me 262 was allowed to be produced as a fighter. On September 19, Kreipe repeated his request, and on November 4, he finally got Hitler to allow the production of the Me 262 fighter version, although still with one condition - "... each aircraft must, if necessary, carry at least one 250-kg bomb. " Needless to say, this condition was simply ignored.

First prototype Me 262 V1, 1941

Third prototype Me 262 V3, 1942

Me262A-1a, JG-7, 1945

Experimental aircraft Me 262A-1a, designed to test radar antennas FuG 218

In the early 1990s, pilot, engineer and businessman Steve Schneider decided to add the Me 262 to the F-86 already in his "collection".

As a result, a replica Me-262 or "replica" was made.

Outwardly, the plane is very similar, but it has lost some kind of rapacity in appearance - it probably affected that it was made not by German, but by American hands ...

Replica Me-262 was first demonstrated on Berlin Air Show ILA-2006

Victor BAKURSKY,

Helmut WALTER,

Andrey FIRSOV

Messerschmitt

The Me-262 turbojet fighter was the most advanced aircraft of all combat vehicles produced during World War II. Back in 1943, Willy Messerschmitt's new aircraft was ready for serial production, but Hitler approved the launch of the aircraft in a series - but only as a high-speed bomber, although some people from the design team tried to prove that the Me-262 was most important just as a fighter. The commander of fighter aviation, the illustrious ace General Galland, believed that it was the Me-262 that was desperately needed to organize reliable air defense.

A month after taking office as head of the Luftwaffe headquarters, Lieutenant General Werner Kreipe made attempts to convey to Hitler the importance of strengthening the Reich's air defense through the use of Me 262 and, therefore, canceling the order for the priority release of the bomber version. On August 30, 1944, he managed to get some concessions from Hitler - every 20th Me 262 was allowed to be produced as a fighter. On September 19, Kreipe repeated his request, and on November 4, he finally got Hitler to allow the production of the Me 262 fighter version, although still with one condition - "... each aircraft must, if necessary, carry at least one 250-kg bomb. " This condition was ignored during production.

The first production version of the Me 262A-la fighter, known unofficially as the "Schwalbe" (Swallow), entered the test team "262" in Leckfeld in July 1944. It practically did not differ from the pre-production Me 262A-0. The construction used conventional alloys. It was practically all riveted, the weight of the structure was deliberately overestimated - everything was done to achieve maximum manufacturability. As practice has shown, the airframe of the Me 262 aircraft turned out to be quite durable. One of the Meeserschmitt test pilots managed to get out of a dive at a speed of 850 km / h at an altitude of 1500 m with an overload equal to 8 g. The absence of any residual deformations on his plane was the best confirmation of the strength of the machine.

Engine Jumo 004B-1 (later B-2 and B-3) was equipped with a small two-stroke Riedel starter. A supply of B4 gasoline of 17 liters was used as fuel for the starter. In addition to this reserve, all the fuel was placed in the fuselage. For this, there were two main and two additional tanks. The capacity of the main tanks was 900 liters, the front auxiliary - 170 liters, the rear auxiliary - 600 liters.

One of the main problems in the development of Me 262 pilots was the high sensitivity of the Jumo 004B motor to fuel supply. The ore should have been moved very slowly up to 6000 rpm, when the engine automatically switched from the starting fuel - gasoline B4 to diesel - J2, after which the rpm increased to 8000. The rpm was reduced to 5000 when removing the pads from the wheels of the chassis and increased to 7000 at the start of the run. During the takeoff, the speed was increased to 8000 - the minimum required for the flight. The sharp movement of the throttles led to engine failure. It was necessary to install an additional fuel supply regulator, which controlled the supply regardless of the position of the throttle at a speed of more than 6000 per minute. But then this regulator was adapted to control the fuel supply over the entire speed range at any position of the throttle. This regulator provided the necessary engine operation and precise speed control depending on the throttle setting.

Radio equipment included a FuG 16zy radio (later replaced by a FuG 15) and a FuG 25a transponder.

The Me 262A-1 was considerably lighter to fly than the Bf 109G. Although the turn radius of the jet fighter was greater than that of piston-engined fighters, it maintained a high turning speed for longer. The acceleration characteristics were much worse than those of propeller-driven aircraft, but the Me 262 had a very high dive speed, even had to be careful not to go beyond the critical Mach number (during the flights on the Me 262, Meeserschmitt test pilot L. Hoffman 7200-7000 m reached a speed of 980 km / h, but for combatant pilots a ban was introduced on exceeding the speed of 900 km / h). The ailerons were effective throughout the entire speed range. At the same time, at speeds above the permissible one, the aircraft always began to spontaneously oscillate about the longitudinal axis (roll). In this case, the roll angle reached 10 °, and the oscillation period was approximately 2 seconds. With a further increase in speed, the aircraft simply began to twist through the wing. In planning, the slats were produced at a speed of 300 km / h. The spin performance was excellent. At high angles of attack, the aircraft was somewhat unstable, and this affected the firing of the cannons. The plane made one oscillation per second, which, however, was easily parried by the rudder. The loss of directional stability also occurred with an increase in flight speed. It is interesting that on the first copies of the aircraft with a linen sheathing of the rudder, directional stability was quite satisfactory. But due to the strength conditions, the fabric sheathing was replaced with metal. Oddly enough, but at the same time directional stability has deteriorated sharply. This was explained by the fact that earlier, when flying at high speeds, the fabric covering of the rudder swelled, thereby creating a thickening of the profile. The designers tried to counter this effect by installing additional ridges in the rear fuselage, but to no avail. Another area of ​​work was the thickening of the profile of the vertical tail while reducing its area (Me 262 V056). This gave certain results when flying at high speeds, but sharply worsened stability and controllability in takeoff and landing modes. In addition, the small area of ​​​​the vertical tail did not give the pilot the opportunity to fly on one engine. They tried to solve this problem by studying the behavior of an aircraft with destabilizing surfaces - a crest was placed on one of the aircraft, going from the canopy to the tail, which reduced static stability, but was subsequently abandoned.

One of the problems faced by both ordinary pilots and test pilots was the spontaneous dragging of the aircraft into a dive at high flight speeds. At the same time, it seemed to the pilots that the nose of the aircraft seemed to be "filled with lead", and the elevator became ineffective. For this reason, there have been many accidents. To my credit German engineers they, solving the problem of increasing flight speed, came to the idea of ​​a swept wing.

Armament. On the Me 262, four MK 108 30 mm cannons were installed in the bow with 100 rounds of ammunition per barrel for the upper guns and 80 for the lower ones. Armament was reduced to two MK 108 reconnaissance aircraft Me 262A-5a and Me 262A-1a/U3.

On the Me 262A-1, various armament options were tested instead of the standard four 30-mm MK 108 cannons (they had poor ballistics, and failed at the first "opportune" opportunity). The Me 262A-1a/Sh was armed with two 20mm MG 151 cannons with 146 rounds per barrel and two 30mm MK 103 cannons with 72 rounds per barrel. The MK 103 differed from the MK 108 in having longer barrels, a muzzle brake and a more powerful projectile with a high muzzle velocity. At the same time, fairings appeared on the nose of the fuselage, above the guns. The combination of their three different types of guns was not accepted into the series, and was limited to the release of only three such Me 262A-la / Ul.

More interesting was the installation of the 50 mm VK 5 gun, first tested on the Me 262A-la (No. 130 083). In this case, the gun protruded 2 m in front of the nose of the aircraft. The installation of the VK 5 led to a shift in the center of gravity, which made it necessary to place a counterweight in the tail. The nose strut was redesigned for cleaning with a turn, so that it occupies less internal volume. Somewhat unexpectedly, but the installation had practically no effect on flight data, but 26-27 out of 30 shells during experimental firing fit into a rectangular target 30 m wide - the wingspan of a four-engine bomber.

Two more Me 262A-la with a VK 5 gun were used for firing tests against ground targets. The issue of installing a 55-mm MK 114 cannon was also considered, but they settled on a 50-mm MK 214A cannon from Rheinmetall-Borsig. Its trials on one Me 262A-la began on March 23, 1945, but they were never completed before the end of the war.

Even more effective weapons were the R4M missiles, designed by Kurt Heber and finished by the DVM (German Armament and Ammunition Institute) in Lübeck. The 55 mm rocket R4M (Rocket, 4 kg) contained a 500 g charge of RDX, which had a good destructive effect. The ballistics of the R4M was practically the same as that of the MK 108 cannon projectile, which made it possible to use the same Revy-16V sight. The simplest wooden rails allowed 12 R4Ms to be carried under each wing. The missile fighter was called the Me 262A-lb. All 24 missiles were fired almost simultaneously, providing a high probability of hitting a four-engine bomber from a distance of about 500 m. Holders for 34 missiles were tested on one of the Me 262A-Ib, and even 48 were planned.

On Me 262 it was also supposed to test Ruhrstahl X4 guided missiles weighing 60 kg and 1.8 m long. The missile was controlled by two wires and had impact and acoustic fuses. The launch range was estimated at 300 m. Four X4 missiles were mounted under the Me 262 wing, but managed to fly only with mock-ups. Real tests have not been carried out. In the interceptor version, the 110-kg R100 / BS rocket with a warhead that had 400 shrapnel bullets was also tested on the aircraft. Aerodynamic tests were carried out for launchers for vertically launched rockets RZ 73.

The pilot's armor protection consisted of 90 mm front bulletproof glass and 15 mm front and rear bulkheads.

Despite the rapid deterioration of the military situation at the beginning of 1945, problems with the supply of components (undercarriage struts, fuel pumps, tools and engines), as well as the ferocity with which the Allies bombed all known factories producing jet aircraft, the importance of the Me 262 production program was such that in the first four months of the year, the factories delivered 865 Me 262. The assembly of the Me 262 was carried out at factories in Leipheim, Leckfeld, Schwabisch Hall, Wenzendorf and Giebelstadt. The most interesting feature of the production was the use of small buildings hidden in the forests. They supplied the main production units and components. The use of simple, wooden structures in the forests proved to be the most effective way to disperse production.

Messerschmitt used the "forest" factories to increase the production of Me 262 in the last months of the war. More than a dozen such factories were built near Leipheim, Kuno, Hogau, Schwabische Halle, Gauting and elsewhere. In some factories, Me 262s were manufactured as a whole. One of these factories in Gorgau - 10 km west of Augsburg on the autobahn - supplied the wings, nose and tail sections of the Me 262 to another "forest" factory nearby, which carried out the final assembly and lifted the finished aircraft directly from the autobahn. The roofs of the buildings were painted green, and as the trees converged over them, it was almost impossible to spot such a plant from the air. Although the Allies managed to spot the Me 262 taking off from the autobahn and bombed several uncovered planes, they were able to establish the location of the plant in the forest only after they occupied it.

Stories about the technical achievements of Germany inevitably raised the question: “If you are so smart, then why are you so poor (lost the war)?” Accordingly, the shortest path to justification was the stories about the stupid and short-sighted Adolf Hitler, who by the time the participants in the events wrote their memoirs had already turned into a shapeless pile of firebrands.

The birth of jet aviation

The coverage of the semi-detective story with "Me.262" requires an explanation of some general principles . The transition to jet engines was indeed a revolutionary event in military aviation. The crisis of the piston engine was outlined already in the 30s. The record aircraft of those years clearly demonstrated the "ceiling" of the development of piston aviation. The increase in engine power did not lead to a proportional increase in speed. Power increase by 1000 hp with. caused an increase in speed of only 50-60 km / h. The record aircraft "Bf109V13" November 11, 1937 reached an average speed of 610.95 km / h. A year and a half later - on March 30, 1939 - the creation of Ernst Heinkel AG, the He 100 V8, exceeded this achievement by more than 130 km / h, reaching 746.606 km / h. Willy Messerschmitt raised this glove, and in the penultimate month, when it was still relevant to register records - in July 1939, the record "Me.209V1" flew at a speed of 755.14 km / h. Record speeds could only be achieved by a sharp increase in engine power. The DB-601R-III motor, installed on the Bf.109V13, developed a power of 1700 hp. s., and "DB-601R-V" on the other two aircraft - 2770 liters. with. Calculations have shown that for a single-seat fighter developing a speed of 1000 km / h, an engine with a capacity of 12,200 liters is needed. with.! Only the mass of the engine itself would be over six tons, and the weight of the entire machine would be 15 tons. The problem was the efficiency of the propeller, which sharply decreased at high speeds. An alternative to the screw was jet thrust. This was clear even at the time when biplanes and corrugated aircraft were going into battle. Therefore, long before the Second World War, the race to create a combat jet began. Already at the end of 1938, Willy Messerschmitt received an official contract for a jet-powered fighter. Note that in 1938 there was not a single flying jet aircraft, and Hans von Ohain's experimental jet engine "HeS 2A" developed a powerful thrust of 80 kg on the stand. Only a year later, the first ever flying jet aircraft took off - a single-seat "He.178", equipped with a HeS 3В engine with a thrust of 510 kilograms. The first historic flight took place at five in the morning on Sunday, August 27, 1939. It was so classified that the Italians, having lifted the Caproni-Campini jet aircraft into the air in August 1940, loudly declared their priority in creating jet aviation for the entire world. However, the Italian aircraft was a jet in the modern sense of the word is very conditional. The compressor that forced air into the combustion chambers was driven by a piston engine, not a gas turbine. They tried to follow the same path in the USSR. The I-250 aircraft of the Mikoyan and Gurevich Design Bureau, as well as the Su-5 of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, were equipped with a VK-107R engine driven by a propeller and a jet engine compressor. But it was a dead end. The combination of two engines made the power plant heavy and uneconomical. The task of the jet engine designers of those years was to create a self-sufficient system in which the compressor is driven by a gas turbine that stands in the way of the gases emanating from the combustion chamber. Such an engine, like Munchausen, dragged itself out of the swamp by the hair and required the compressor to spin up from external source only during launch. In fact, two tasks were solved - the creation of an efficient gas turbine and a jet engine as a whole.

The main problem for the designers of the first jet aircraft was the low thrust of the jet engines of that period. 500-600 kilograms is quite a bit. Suffice it to say that the VK-107A engine with a capacity of 1700 liters. s., standing on the Yak-3 fighter, gave a thrust of 3000 kg (three tons!). The only difference was that the efficiency of the propeller of a piston aircraft did not allow the full use of this thrust at high flight speeds. Therefore, jet aircraft could develop greater speed, exceeding the threshold at which the propeller powerlessly thrashed the air. Otherwise, the first jet engines were inferior to piston engines, which reached the peak of their development in the 40s. The first jet aircraft, "He.280", because of this, was as narrow as possible. The fuselage diameter at the cockpit was only 800 mm, the smallest possible size for any comfortable pilot location.

In the spring of 1942, the first training air combat of a jet aircraft took place. The enemy of "He.280" was the latest "Focke-Wulf-190A". The jet fighter easily won the fight against his piston opponent. The reasons for this are quite obvious: the jet engine made it possible to quickly gain altitude, turn around and catch up with the enemy, going into his tail.

However, the flight range of the "Ne.280" - about 600 km - was insufficient for effective use as an interceptor aircraft. Moreover, it was not so much the range in kilometers (“La-5” or “Me.109” had a similar range), but the time spent in the air in flight. Flight time was less than half an hour, almost half of which was spent on takeoff and landing. Despite attempts to launch the "Ne.280" in a series, the "Me.262" was a more promising machine. Messerschmitt's plane, more precisely, his third "Querzuh" (prototype), "Me.262V3", in the summer of 1942 for the first time took to the air using only jet propulsion. Actually, "Me.262V3" constantly got into accidents starting from August 1942, until it was finally defeated in the spring of 1943. But by April 1943, the next prototype, "Me.262V4", was ready, and work continued.

Galland sits at the helm of "Me.262"

On May 22, 1943, a flight on a prototype of a new jet fighter was carried out by an inspector of fighter aircraft, the legendary fighter pilot, the hero of the Battle of Britain, Major General Adolf Galland. At the personal request of Milch, he visited the Messerschmitt factory to evaluate the aircraft. After arriving at the airfield, he was introduced to the machine and instruments in the cockpit of a jet fighter. With the help of mechanics, Galland started the engines. The first attempt nearly ended in disaster. Galland increased the speed of the turbine too quickly, an over-rich mixture formed, and flames flared from one of the engines. The fire was quickly extinguished, but the engine had to be inspected. For the inspector of fighter aviation, a second car was prepared - "Me.262V4". Now he started the engines more carefully and took off without any problems.

Flying in a jet plane made an indelible impression on Galland. After landing, in a telephone conversation with Milch, the general said: "It's like flying to the angels!" He expressed his opinion in the official report, the essence of which is given below:

High Command of the Luftwaffe

Fighter Aviation Inspector

Dear Reichsmarschall.

Last Saturday he made a test flight on the Me.262 in Augsburg in the presence of several representatives of the RLM. Regarding this machine, I can say the following:

The aircraft is a huge step forward, guaranteeing us superiority in aerial warfare as long as the enemy uses piston-engined machines.

From the pilot's point of view, the flight characteristics of the aircraft make a very good impression.

The engines work well, except for the takeoff and landing phase.

The aircraft sets new requirements for us, if we talk about the tactics of its use.

I request you to consider the following issue:

Fighter "Fw 190 D" is constantly improving and in the future will be comparable to the "Me.209" in most respects. Both aircraft, however, will not be able to overtake enemy bombers at high altitudes.

The necessary efficiency can only be ensured when significant progress is made in the field of armament and the speed of our aircraft.

Finally I suggest:

a) stop work on "Me.209";

b) focus on improving the Fw 190 with BMW 801, Jumo 213 and DB 603 engines;

c) to concentrate the released production capacities on Me.262.

Upon my return, I will report in person.

((signed) Adolf Galland)

This report, based on which A. Galland subsequently vigorously promoted the Me.262 as a jet fighter, seems to be a very interesting document. These are the subjective feelings of a fighter pilot, and from a very superficial acquaintance with the new aircraft. On the same day, a new four-engine aircraft (Me.264) was being tested, and initially Galland asked one of the pilots to accompany him on the Me.109. However, both the heavy bomber attack plan and mock combat with a fighter were forgotten. The impressions were compiled during a simple familiarization flight. If Galland had to conduct at least a training dogfight, he would have encountered the same phenomenon as in the trial run of the engine. The sharp movements of the engine control handle, so familiar to fighter pilots, caused an engine fire.

The mechanism of this phenomenon is simple. gas turbine rather inert, and the increase in compressor speed is relatively slow. Accordingly, with the rapid movement of the gas sector, the amount of injected fuel increases much faster than the volume of air supplied by the engine compressor. The combustion temperature of the fuel rises, and the turbine blades begin to burn out. After burning several blades, an unbalance of the rotor occurs and, as a result, engine shaking. The shaking breaks the fuel lines, fuel floods the hot engine. There is a fire. On the early "Me.262" the engine was not separated from the wing by a fireproof partition, and an engine fire could lead to a burnout of the power set of the wing. The plane would just fall apart in the air.

Another point that deserves attention in the Galland report is the thesis that piston fighters will not be able to "overtake enemy bombers at high altitudes." It made some sense in the spring of 1943, when the main opponents of the Reich's air defense were British night bombers (which were generally coped with) and single flights at high altitudes of the American "Flying Fortresses". Already in the summer and autumn of 1943 the situation changed fundamentally. The main threat came from massive daylight air raids by American heavy bombers with strong fighter cover. In such battles, it was the quantitative balance of forces that was important, and not the altitude. Adolf Galland, however, did not bother to increase the number of fighter pilots, apparently hoping for a new miracle weapon. The logic was quite unpretentious: in the fall of 1943, a miracle weapon appeared, and instead of the routine work of preparing large masses of pilots, it would be possible to draw abschussbalkens on the tail again. Such was the logic of Speer as the head of the German military-industrial complex. The creation of a miracle weapon eliminated the need for a sharp increase in the production of samples already in service. However, in the fall of 1943, the jet fighter did not appear in the German air defense.

Black September?

What happened to the Me.262 in the month when, according to Speer, Hitler ordered the jet fighter to be discontinued? In September 1943, the aircraft went through quite a routine test program. On September 20, 1943, the Me.262V3 prototype reached a speed of 960 km/h at an altitude of 5000 m. At the same time, it was found that with an increase in speed, the vibration of the tail section of the fuselage and the general instability of the aircraft increase. The reason for this was considered uneven air flow around the cockpit canopy. To confirm or refute this version of events, "Me.262V3" made several flights in December, pasted over with cotton ribbons. The view of the ribbons in flight was filmed, which made it possible to see the actual picture of the passage of air flows along the fuselage crest between the cockpit and vertical tail. In a word, nothing happened in September except for the strange behavior of the aircraft at high speeds. "Me.262" was a revolutionary machine, and such oddities were encountered at every turn. For example, the air flow tore out the cockpit glazing from the canopy cover. Some things were simply mystical. The magnetic coils in the electrical position indicators of the landing gear constantly burned out. Analysis of the circuit showed that the coils were calculated correctly, and on the ground stand they worked perfectly fine. But on the plane, they mysteriously failed over and over again. The reason was considered the nature of the vibration of the aircraft at high speeds.

However, gradually wading through many difficulties, the aircraft became a full-fledged combat vehicle. October 17, 1943 took off "Me.262V6". The aircraft carried the serial number of the new series (W.Nr. 130001), which actually denoted the first pre-production aircraft. This happened a month after Hitler's mythical order to stop the production of Me.262, which Speer writes about. In fact, in October 1943, "Me.262" finally acquired the form we are used to. The aircraft received a tricycle landing gear with a front wheel. Cannon carriages were mounted in the weapons bay, but the guns themselves were still missing. The aircraft was equipped with Jumo 004B-0 engines, which were housed in new nacelles with improved aerodynamics.

The aircraft was shown to the Fuhrer on November 26, 1943 in Insterburg (East Prussia). Hitler, of course, eventually asked about the possibility of hanging bombs. Messerschmitt, knowing that only one answer would satisfy the Fuhrer, confidently answered: "Yes!" Then Hitler said: "None of you even thought that this is exactly the high-speed bomber that we have been waiting for ten years!"

The conversation was attended, among others, by Adolf Galland and the test pilots Lindner and Baur. The Fuhrer's statement took everyone by surprise. Galland recalled that he was amazed at the prospect of changing the Me.262's mission from a fighter to a bomber. A similar impression was made on him by Hitler's later statement that this plane would stop the Allied invasion.

Karl Baur spoke about his impressions to his wife Isolde, who, by the way, was an employee of the department that developed the Me.264 bomber.

Izolda recalled: “Upon returning home, my husband told me:“ You won’t believe it, but he wants to make a bomber out of Me.262! At that moment, we realized for ourselves that Hitler must be crazy. Everyone in the Messerschmitt firm was aware that a completely new aircraft was needed for such tasks, since the Me.262 was designed from the very beginning as a fighter. But Hitler didn't want to listen to anyone."

Let us note that people who have a very remote relation to the operational use of the Air Force are complacently twisting their fingers to their temples. A. Galland was a fighter pilot who advanced after several dozen abshussbalkens painted on the keel. Baur was a test pilot. His wife is an engineer. All these powerful thinkers from aviation, together with Willy Messerschmitt himself, were very narrow specialists. Before us are not the words of the gray-haired commanders of the air fleets, whom Hitler often listened to. Their words that the plane was developed as a fighter and therefore cannot be used as a bomber are all the more unconvincing. There are a number of examples where native fighters were subsequently used in the role of strike aircraft, and vice versa. For example, the Focke-Wulf-190 was originally a fighter, but already in the second year of its combat use, its Friedrich and Gustav modifications, an attack aircraft and a bomber, respectively, appeared. Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighters had the ability to carry bombs and were often used as bombers; special squadrons were created in fighter squadrons, designed only for bombing strikes. The Soviet bomber "Pe-2" grew out of the high-altitude fighter "100" of the Petlyakov Design Bureau. Most of the American fighters quite successfully served as strike aircraft.

After Hitler's departure, powerful minds pondered for a long time what to do, and in the end the Fuhrer's order was diplomatically ignored. "Schwalbe" remained a fighter. The only "bomb" test was the flight of the inspector of bomber aircraft, Colonel Dietrich Peltz, on the "Me.262V6", which took place at the end of 1943. According to some reports, the aircraft temporarily received, mainly to satisfy Hitler's desire, bomb racks for hanging 250-kg bombs under the fuselage . Hitler himself stubbornly bent his line, despite the stubbornness of the designers and the former ace. On December 5, his adjutant from the Luftwaffe transmitted a telegram to Göring, which read: “The Führer once again draws our attention to extraordinary importance of production jet-powered aircraft that can be used as fighter-bombers. There is a need for the Luftwaffe to have new aircraft ready for combat in the spring of 1944. Any problems arising from a shortage of manpower or an insufficient supply of raw materials will be dealt with by strategic stockpiles until the situation returns to normal. The Führer is aware that a delay in the program for the construction of our jet fighters would be tantamount to criminal frivolity. The Fuhrer ordered that every two months he be presented with a progress report on the "Me.262" and "Ar.234" (highlighted by me - A.I.). "Arado-234" was another jet aircraft of the Third Reich. It was a clean bomber.

To say that Hitler's words about the spring of 1944 were prescient is to say nothing. It was for the Allied landings in Normandy that “invulnerable” high-speed bombers were needed to carry out extremely important missions. The fact is that the Allies planned Operation Overlord on the basis that it was impossible to land in ports. The ports on the coast of France were well protected by coastal artillery, barriers, and the most combat-ready formations of the Wehrmacht were based around them. But the landing troops demanded a non-stop supply of fuel, ammunition and reinforcements. It was possible to organize all this only if there was a full-fledged port with a pier and a breakwater in the landing zone. To carry out unloading with the help of boats from transports would be simply ridiculous. The transports could not come close enough to the shore, since their draft was much greater than the depth near the beaches of Normandy. Accordingly, the allies decided to create a port from scratch on a bare coast. They decided to build a breakwater by flooding ships, including obsolete battleships. But the main highlight of the engineering support of the landings in Normandy were floating piers, called "Mulbury-1" and "Mulbury-2". They were supposed to ensure the unloading of transports in the same way as a regular port. The protection of these flimsy structures had to be guaranteed by the dominance of allied aviation in the air. The only aircraft capable of breaking through the defenses of the airspace above the drop zone would be a jet bomber. And most importantly, a blow to the very heart of the Overlord did not require the massive use of aviation. It was enough for a few aircraft that barely crossed the border between experimental machines and the series. The absence of a scorer with a special sight on the Me.262 was not a significant obstacle to this action. By that time, sufficient experience had already been accumulated in the combat use of single-seat attack aircraft and bombers based on the Focke-Wulf-190. The Mulbury's piers were massive enough to hit them with a large bomb from a shallow dive. Such a task was quite within the power of "Me.262" with an experienced bomber pilot at the helm. Attacks on transports in the landing zone by the method of top-mast bombing could also turn out to be quite promising. This bombing technology also did not require a dedicated bombsight. The applicability of top-mast strikes using jet aircraft was quite eloquently demonstrated by Argentine pilots in the conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in May-June 1982.

The use of the Me.262 as a bomber could be even more effective if the aircraft was prepared for the attack aircraft mission in advance. A. Hitler voiced his desire to get not a fighter, but a fighter-bomber even before the Me.262 took off on jet propulsion. This could make it possible to mount a television aiming system on it, to equip a jet bomber with guided weapons.

The first attacks of German jet fighters were carried out against defenseless scouts. In most cases, these were unarmed piston aircraft flying in splendid isolation over Germany. Their salvation was a high flight altitude and a relatively high speed. In a duel with a jet aircraft, both advantages over the interceptors of the Third Reich disappeared. Therefore, fighters from Erprobungskommando 262 (Test Team 262) could operate with complete impunity. The first such execution of an unarmed intelligence officer took place on July 26, 1944, when Lieutenant Alfred Schreiber, on his Me.262, was the first to shoot down an enemy vehicle in Ekdo 262. It was generally the first aircraft in the history of aviation shot down by a jet-powered fighter. Schreiber's victim was a reconnaissance "Mosquito" from the 544th Squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF) - the crew of Flight Lieutenant (Captain) Voll and Pilot Officer (Lieutenant) Lobban. Six days later - on August 2 - the shooting of the unarmed was repeated, and Schreiber won a second victory, this time destroying the Spitfire PR IX. The next reconnaissance "Mosquito" (540 Squadron, the crew of Flight Lieutenant Matthewman and Flight Sergeant Stopford) fell victim to Me.262 less than a week later, on 8 August. Lieutenant Joachim Weber distinguished himself by overtaking his opponent over Olstadt.

In the meantime, mass production of "Me.262" was launched (see Table 5).

Table 5

Production "Me.262" *

*Data provided by Vajda&Dancey. German aircraft industry.

It is clearly seen that initially a really large part of the release of "Me.262" was in the bomber version. This, however, does not change the fact that fighters were concentrated in Test Team 262. Of the 84 "Me.262" available on August 10, 1944, 33 aircraft belonged to the 1st group of the 51st bomber squadron, 15 - to the "Test Team 262", 14 - to the test center in Rechlin, 11 - tests at the Messerschmitt company , 1 - at the Junkers company for testing engines, and, finally, 10 - for conversion into doubles at Blom and Foss.

At the same time, it should be noted that the production of "Me.262" was hampered, first of all, by the lack of engines. Because of this, in April 1944, the Luftwaffe received 16 vehicles, and in May - only 7. According to the English aviation historian Alfred Price: “The lack of engines, more than any other factor, held back the Me.262 readiness to the middle 1944" . The resource of the YuMO-004 engine in the spring of 1944 was only 10 hours. For comparison, up to the limit, forced piston engines of the same period had a resource of about 25 hours, and this was considered a rather low indicator. Worst of all, the Junkers Motoren engine often flared up for no apparent reason.

Blitz bombers go to battle

In mid-May 1944, Hitler decided that all Me.262s produced by that time (with the exception of those allocated to the 262 test team) should be sent to bomber units. According to him, jets used as high-speed front-line bombers should have provided the necessary support to the Wehrmacht. The conduct of hostilities in the conditions of dominance of the Allies in the air actually deprived the German command of the opportunity to influence the course of battles by the most maneuverable means of war - aviation. Any attempt to attack the advancing Allied divisions with bombers or attack aircraft could turn into a beating of German aviation by the ubiquitous Mustangs. Jet bombers could operate in such difficult conditions with much less risk. In this regard, on May 29, Goering convened a meeting in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, in which Generals Galland, Bodenschatz, Korten and Colonel Petersen took part. Despite their already commonplace objections, the Reichsmarschall ordered the Me.262 bomber squadrons to be equipped, and the tests of the Me.262 as a fighter to be postponed to a later date or carried out on a limited scale. This decision was favored by the availability of trained bomber pilots. Their retraining for fighters, as a rule, did not lead to anything good.

Five days after the meeting in Berlin - June 3, 1944 - Colonel Wolf-Dietrich Meister, at that time the commander of the III group of the 51st bomber squadron, received an order to hand over the twin-engine Yu-88 bombers used so far and go along with pilots and ground personnel to the Lechfeld base for the purpose of retraining for jet "Me.262". Known as the Edelweiss Squadron, the 51st Bombardment Squadron had extensive combat experience gained during operations against Great Britain in 1940, hitting desperate Soviet tank counterattacks near Brody and Dubno, raids on Moscow. In fact, the pilots of the squadron were "universal", capable of striking both at targets on the battlefield and at objects deep behind enemy lines. According to plan III, the group was to reach operational readiness in August, and it was decided to rearm the remaining groups of the squadron as aircraft arrived from assembly shops Messerschmitt factories. Thus, the IV group began the retraining cycle in August at the Munich-Riem airfield, and the I and II groups - at the beginning of October at the Rhine-Hopsten airfield. The name of the squadron has also changed. From now on, instead of the 51st bomber squadron, in all documents it was called the 51st bomber (fighter) squadron. When the Allies landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944, one of the leaders of the Ministry of Armaments, Otto Saur, even said at a meeting with Hitler that the Me.262, used as bombers, would simply drop the invasion troops into the sea. However, the measures taken to turn the Me.262 from a toy of aces into a truly effective combat vehicle were too late. A few more weeks would have to pass before the 51st squadron reached full readiness. The Me.262 fighter-bombers, called "Albatrosses", did not enter the battlefield until July 27, when the first ten machines, which made up the 3rd squadron under the command of Hauptmann Wolfgang Schenk, raided the allied troops still on the beaches of Normandy. The attack had no noticeable effect, without causing serious losses in the ranks of the enemy. German aircraft (mostly zero series) did not yet have bomber sights installed, and pilots had to drop bombs using the sights of on-board small arms and their own experience. Until the completion of the re-equipment of the III group with jet bombers, the 3 squadron operated independently and went down in history under the name "Team Schenk" (Kommando Schenk).

On August 12, in view of the beginning of the Allied offensive, the 51st squadron was relocated to the Etampes airfield near Chartres, and four days later to the Kreil airfield near Paris. She stayed there until 27 August, when she again changed her base, this time to Juvencourt, from where she was sent to Shievre in Belgium the next day due to the threat from British fighters. On August 28, Me.262 attacked ground targets in Melun, near Paris, where the Americans had already managed to get. On this day, the group suffered its first losses. Around 19.15, Chief Sergeant-Major Hieronymus Lauer, returning to the airfield, was attacked by Thunderbolts. The lead R-47 opened fire on the descending Me.262. He caught his wing on the ground and crashed. The relocation sequence continued on August 30, when the 51st Squadron moved to the Volkel and Eindhoven airfields in Holland, from where it was to be used to stop enemy troops at the turn of the Albert Canal at Antwerp and Luren. The Allied command was very concerned about the activities of the new German jet bombers. In this regard, on September 3, several dozen night Lancasters and Halifaxes raided the Folkel airfield. It is not known how many Me.262s were destroyed or damaged there, but in any case, no more operations were carried out from the territory of Holland. The remaining vehicles were assigned to the Rhein-Hoerstel and Rhein-Hopsten airfields.

In the autumn of 1944, the qualities of the Me.262 appeared as a highly effective weapon for the destruction of especially important objects. Beginning on September 26, the Me.262 pilots of the 51st Fighter-Bomber Squadron bombed the intact bridge in Nimwegen captured by the British. On the first day, only one aircraft was lost, hit by anti-aircraft artillery. Attempts to intercept jet bombers by fighters, as a rule, ended in failure. On September 30, at about 0930 hours, a patrol of six Spitfires met two Me.262s with suspended bombs heading for the bridge in the same vicinity. The Canadians immediately rushed at the German bombers, who immediately dropped their cargo and got out of the attack at full speed. Only on October 13 did the British manage to win the first victory over Me.262. Pilot officer Robert Cole, who flew the Tempest, chalked up the jet Messerschmitt.

Fighters and anti-aircraft guns could not provide practically any resistance to jet bombers. "Me.262" acted one by one, reaching the target at an altitude of 8000 m during the day, and dropped bombs from a gentle dive from a height of 6000 m. With such a high flight speed and change in altitude, anti-aircraft guns were useless. Jet "Messerschmitts" could operate with virtually impunity, which caused the fury of the opposing side. No amount of air cover for the bridge could solve this problem. The newest Spitfires Mk. XIV" and "Tempes", but they did not achieve any noticeable success.

The strikes on the bridge were followed by several daring attacks on British airfields. On October 1, 1944, the Me.262 group attacked the Grave airfield near Niemwegen. As a result of a lightning strike, the Germans destroyed five Spitfires on the airfield, and seriously damaged three more. Large losses were among the pilots and ground personnel. The commander of the 80th squadron, R. Acworth, was seriously wounded. All German aircraft returned safely to base. The next day, the Me.262 again attacked the British in the Grave, where in the meantime the 80th and 274th Tempest squadrons and the 130th and 402nd squadrons of the newest Spitfire Mk. XIV. The bombs from the jet bombers wreaked havoc among the ground personnel and destroyed at least seven Spitfires. And again, the anti-aircraft gunners, taken by surprise, did not distinguish themselves either by reaction or by accuracy. Already at the very beginning, several firing positions were suppressed by a hail of deadly fragments. The pilots of the Tempests tried to intercept the Me.262 returning to the base, but the jet machines leaving at maximum speed turned out to be an unattainable target.

The "finest hour" of jet bombers was the operation "Bodenplatte" ("Base plate") on New Year's Eve 1945. "Me.262" from the 51st bomber squadron together with "Me.109" and "FV-190" from 3- th fighter squadron attacked the English airfield at Endhoven, where 50 Spitfires and Typhoons were destroyed. This was the most effective strike on the airfield in the entire Bodenplatte operation. In fact, jet bombers fought for air supremacy, not shooting down single Allied aircraft, but destroying them at airfields - another argument in favor of building the Me.262 as a strike aircraft.

One of the most famous actions of jet bombers was the attacks on the bridge in Remagen. It was the only bridge over the Rhine that the Allies got intact. On March 7, 1945, the American 9th Panzer Division approached the Ludendorff Bridge in Remagen and captured it, having managed to prevent the explosion. The bridge was immediately protected from water and air. Omar Bradley wrote: “So much anti-aircraft artillery was transferred to the bridgehead, the density of fire of which was only two times lower than the density of anti-aircraft fire we created on the bridgehead in Normandy. Barriers were stretched upstream across the Rhine to protect the bridge from underwater and radio-controlled mines. Patrols were posted on both sides of the bridge, making sure that enemy saboteurs did not leak onto the bridge as part of our columns. Barrage balloons were raised into the air from heights on both banks of the Rhine, depth charges were dropped into the water to prevent enemy demolition divers from approaching the bridge unnoticed. However, for protection against jet bombers, all these measures were useless. To destroy the bridge, a special group was formed, consisting of eight Arado-234 bombers (from the 76th bomber squadron) and about thirty Me.262s from Group I of the 51st bomber squadron. The obstacle for the jet "Me.262" was only the lack of guided weapons - diving, like the "Ju-87", was unrealizable on them. In general, the actions of German jet aircraft resembled the actions of piston bombers without fighter and anti-aircraft countermeasures. The first raid was not successful, nor were the next twelve. Only Colonel Robert Kowalski on the Arado 234 managed to damage one bridge span, but American engineering units quickly fixed it. But in the end, the badly damaged bridge collapsed on its own, from the close rupture of a heavy projectile. However, by that time, the Americans had transferred five divisions to the bridgehead, and the destruction of the bridge was belated.

During the period of fighting for the Remagen bridge, the 51st squadron lost only one pilot and two cars. It is unlikely that "Ju-88" or "Xe.111" in 1940 in France or in 1942 somewhere near Rostov could have performed better. On the other hand, attempts to attack the same target with conventional bombers would lead to their beating, just as dozens of Soviet SB and DB-3 shot down in 1941 when trying to destroy the captured bridges near Dvinsk and on the Berezina. If Messerschmitt had been puzzled by the use of the Me.262 as a bomber back in the spring of 1943, then the combination of a jet aircraft and guided weapons could have given the Luftwaffe a tool similar to the unkind memory Yu-87 "thing" capable of destroying bridges, point targets on the battlefield and in the near rear of the enemy.

Repetition of the past

The use of "Me.262" as an interceptor was not as successful as it is commonly represented. The appearance of a jet fighter-interceptor in the air defense of the Reich seemed to turn back the clock. The enemies of the German fighter pilots were again heavy bomber gunners. It was already in 1943 when the Americans first used the tactic of massive daylight raids by heavy bombers in close formation. The “box” of “Fortresses” and “Liberators” flying in a spatial wedge created a very dense zone of fire in the rear hemisphere, making fighter attacks almost impossible. The Germans found a cure for this in attacking the Fortress formation head-on, when the bomber gunners had little time to aim and fire. On a jet plane, such an attack was simply impossible. Not only the arrows of the "B-17" and "B-24", but also the pilot of the fighter simply did not have time to open fire. Forced to attack from the rear hemisphere, the Me.262 again encountered 12.7-mm bullets that hit the target simply by massing the fire. In addition, an attack from the rear hemisphere required more ammunition. The cockpit was located in the bow, the only hit in the B-17 fuselage by a 30-mm MK-108 cannon projectile from the front hemisphere guaranteed the bomber's further flight in a spiral leading to the ground. From the rear hemisphere, it was necessary to achieve fatal damage to the airframe of the aircraft (at least three hits of 30-mm shells) or disable at least two engines. At the high flight speed of the Me.262, the presence of four MK-108 guns did not promise a guaranteed result of a suicidal attack through the paths of the shooters' bullets. The fact is that the MK-108 guns were a rather peculiar weapon. Structurally, they were an aviation "PPSh": a stamped bolt box, automatics operated on the principle of recoil of a free shutter. But for the simplicity of the design had to pay the tactical characteristics of the weapon. The free shutter limited the initial velocity of the 330-gram MK-108 projectile to 540 m/s. The rate of fire of the cannon was also low - 600 rounds per minute. For comparison, the 20-mm projectile of the German MG-151/20 aircraft gun left the barrel at a speed of 805 m/s, and the rate of fire of the gun was up to 900 rounds per minute. The low muzzle velocity of the MK-108 projectile led to a large dispersion of the queue, and the effective firing range was 150-200 meters, that is, almost point blank. As a temporary solution, 24 R-4M missiles were placed under the wings on Me.262. One hit of the R-4M, the warhead of which carried half a kilo of hexogen, was enough to destroy a heavy bomber from any hemisphere. In fact, missiles became the main weapon of the interceptor.

What did all this lead to? On September 11, 1944, pilots from Test Team 262 attacked heavy bombers for the first time. They intercepted a B-17 formation from the 100th Bomber Group returning from the raid, escorted by Mustangs from the 339th Fighter Group. In fact, jet fighters attacked a group already beaten over the target. The bombers had already suffered heavy losses as a result of the Me.109 and FV-190 attacks. Despite this, the Me.262 did not shoot down a single Flying Fortress, only one jet fighter pilot - Helmut Baudach - managed to shoot down the Mustang of the escort forces. The next day, the Americans carried out massive raids on various targets in southern Germany. Over 900 bombers attacked oil refineries and aircraft factories. During the confrontation, the German air defense forces destroyed 31 B-17s and B-24s. Most of these aircraft were shot down by Me.109 and FV-190 piston fighters. Only three vehicles became victims of the Me.262 - Captain Georg-Peter Eder of the 262 test team shot down two Flying Fortresses reliably and one - probably.

Soon, instead of a test team, a whole fighter squadron, JG7 Novotny, was armed with jet fighters. It is quite interesting to trace the combat activity of the squadron in 1945, when it reached a good complete set of aircraft and pilots. The second half of March 1945 was the time of the squadron's most successful operations. Almost daily, it came to air duels involving dozens, and sometimes hundreds of aircraft from both sides. On March 17, several Me.262s from Group III took off to intercept the B-17s attacking Ruland, Bohlen and Cottbus. Non-commissioned officer Koster shot down two "fortresses", and Ober-Lieutenant Wegmann and Ober-Sergeant Gobel - one each. One of the most epic air battles took place on March 18 over Berlin, when three bomber formations of the 8th Air Army (1221 bombers escorted by 632 fighters) were attacked by a large group of fighters from various parts of the Reich Defense. Among them were at least 37 Me.262 fighters (mainly from Group III of the 7th Fighter Squadron), of which 28 actually entered the battle. On this day, R-4M missiles were used on a large scale for the first time. German jet fighter pilots claimed the destruction of 12 bombers and 1 fighter. The commander of the Novotny squadron, Major Weisenberger, shot down three Flying Fortresses. Ober-Lieutenant Wegmann, Lieutenant Schnorer, Fenrik Erig and Ober-Fenrik Ulrich chalked up two downed B-17s each. Oberleutnant Schall shot down a Mustang, and Oberleutnant Seeler, Lieutenants Redmacher and Sturm each shot down a Flying Fortress. The real losses of the Americans amounted to 8 heavy bombers. During this battle, Lieutenant Wegmann was shot down and left his plane with a parachute. In addition to his car, the squadron lost five others, as well as two pilots - Lieutenant Karl-Heinz Seeler, who fell victim to the gunner of one of the bombers, and Hans Waldmann, who collided with his wingman. The next day, March 19, 45 "Me.262" from the III group of the 7th fighter squadron in the Chemnitz region intercepted the "B-17" formation. 28 jet fighters made contact with the enemy. Rockets were fired again, and six American heavy bombers were killed by the Germans. This result had to be paid with the loss of two cars with pilots. Ober-sergeant major Heinz Matushka and Lieutenant Harry Meyer, who were shot down by the Mustangs, did not return to the base. The raids followed one after another, on March 20 a raid on Hamburg took place. 29 jet fighters of the 3rd group of the 7th squadron set out to meet the bombers. Of these, 25 "Me.262" made contact with the enemy. This time, the jet pilots managed to destroy nine Flying Fortresses, mostly with R-4M missiles. 10:2 ratio between downed heavy bombers and own losses. Chief corporal Gelker and chief sergeant major Gen, who were shot down by cover Mustangs, were killed. During March 21–31, the Novotny squadron continuously fought with allied bombers. In ten days, 92 aircraft were shot down with the loss of 26 fighters and 14 pilots. The dynamics of downed and qualitative composition of jet fighter victims are as follows:

March 21- 16 American aircraft were shot down (thirteen B-17 Flying Fortress, one B-24 Liberator, one P-47 Thunderbolt and one P-51 Mustang). One of the German pilots claimed three aircraft from this list, another one claimed two, the rest claimed one shot down. The real losses of the Americans, according to post-war data, are five heavy bombers.

March 22- 15 American aircraft were shot down (thirteen B-17s and two P-51s). All victories were single, that is, each pilot claimed one Allied aircraft shot down per day.

March 23- three B-24s were shot down, two victories of Major Erler and one victory of Chief Sergeant Reingold.

March 24- 14 Allied aircraft were shot down (ten B-17s, two R-51s, one R-38 and one Tempest). There was only one double victory, the rest of the German pilots claimed one shot down.

March 25–27- 10 Allied aircraft were shot down (seven B-24s, two P-51s and one Lancaster). All victories are single.

March 28–30- 11 Allied aircraft were shot down (five B-17s, five R-51s and one Mosquito). Stele, Rudorfer and Schnorer claimed double victories, the rest shot down one Allied aircraft each.

As we can see, on average, about 10 heavy bombers and 2-3 escort fighters were shot down. This is, frankly, a little. In the course of repelling a raid on Berlin on March 6, 1944, 69 four-engine bombers and 11 fighters were shot down by the Reich's air defense. They were shot down by the usual piston "Me.109" and "FV-190". Suppose that a miracle happened and the completeness of the 7th Fighter Squadron was achieved by a certain Luftwaffe unit in the winter of 1944. There is no reason to assume that the performance would be greater than actually achieved in March 1945. In this regard, the statement of Adolf Galland looks rather strange: “I would rather have one Me.262 than five improved Me.109s. In most cases, during the repulsion of allied air raids in March 1945, Me.262 pilots shot down one aircraft (most likely with R-4M missiles). A much better result could have been achieved by massive attacks by the FV-190 pistons.

Most clearly demonstrates the real effectiveness of "Me.262" as an air defense system, the most massive use of a jet fighter in the entire history of its use. On April 9, 1945, the Germans had about two hundred combat-ready Me.262s at their disposal. They were distributed (Table 6):

It would hardly be possible to count on more combat-ready aircraft in 1944 with any acceleration of the jet aircraft building program. On April 10, 1945, these aircraft were thrown into battle against 1,100 American bombers. 55 jet planes took off to intercept, 48 aircraft came into direct contact with the enemy. 9 downed and 3 presumed downed heavy bombers were claimed. The real losses of the Americans amounted to 10 bombers. This success was achieved at the cost of losing 27 Me.262s (almost half of the aircraft that took off).

If we multiply the number of aircraft that took off on April 10, 1945 and the number that came into contact with the enemy by the coefficient proposed by Galland, we get 275 sorties and 240 aircraft that came into contact, based on piston engines. If we compare these figures with the raid on March 6, 1944, we get the following picture. In the course of repelling that air defense raid of the Reich, 528 sorties were carried out, of which 369 ended in engagement with the enemy. 53 B-17s, 16 B-24s, 1 R-38, 5 R-47s and 5 R-51s were shot down. The losses of the air defense forces amounted to 22 Me.109, 19 FV-190, 6 Me.410, 11 Me.110 day fighters and 9 Me.110 night fighters. These are real data on losses, not the results declared by the pilots. We see that even being diluted with night and day twin-engine Me.110s, obviously unable to withstand the Mustangs and Thunderbolts of the escort, piston fighters achieved quite a significant result. Not a dozen, but seven dozen heavy bombers were shot down. Based on the real effectiveness of the Me.262, then at least 300-400 sorties of jet fighters would be required to destroy 70 Allied heavy bombers. This is hardly one and a half times less than what was required on March 6, 1944 by the piston Me.109 and FV-190.

Contrary to the claims of Adolf Galland, the air defense of the Reich did not require quality, but quantity. Much more promising than the creation of jet fighters (shooting down a maximum of 10-15 vehicles in one raid), it seems to be the creation of a system for replenishing the losses of people and equipment. In the same raid on March 6, 1944, the Reich air defense lost 46 pilots killed and wounded. And there was nothing to make up for these losses. However, Galland did not bother with this issue, his thoughts were occupied with the "wonder weapon".

"Jagdferband" Galland goes into battle

In 1945, Galland was sent to do what he really knew how to do - fly and shoot down. In early February 1945, an elite unit was created under his command - "Jagdverband 44". It was not a squadron, not a group and not a squadron, so it got such a peculiar name. By order of February 24, 1945, it included 16 Me.262 aircraft and 15 pilots. Galland selected a number of well-known aces of the East and West - Steinhof, Krupinski, Barkhorn, Baer - into the division. However, it was not possible to fully equip the Ferband with knights of the Knight's Cross - several pilots who did not have extensive combat experience got into the unit. Let us consider a flight on April 8, 1945, which is quite typical for Jagdverband 44. A trio of Me.262s headed by Colonel Steinhof flew out on a combat mission. Steinhof's followers were a young pilot, Lieutenant Farhmann, and an ace on the Eastern Front, Captain Krupinski. German fighters were flying at an altitude of 6000 m at the foot of the Alps. The commander of the troika was the first to notice the target. Steinhof radioed his wingmen: "Lightnings" on the left, below! – and began to rise. Farhmann did not stay in the ranks and remained 1000 m below. Steinhof went into a dive and attacked the R-38 group. However, the attack by American fighters was unsuccessful - Steinhof took the wrong lead when firing. The shells of his guns did not hit any aircraft. Troika Me.262 withdrew from the battle and continued flying towards Stuttgart, from where the guidance center reported enemy bombers. The leader gained an altitude of 8000 m, where Farhmann found his plane and joined him. A minute later, Krupinski also came up. Let us note that all the laws of the tactics of couples (Rotte) cherished back in Spain were violated. "Me.262" from "Jagdferband 44" flew on a mission in threes (Kette). The leader's plane flew at the tip of the wedge, with an excess over the followers. In battle, as the experience of the combat operations of trios of piston fighters in 1939-1942 has already demonstrated, such a formation crumbled. In fact, each of the Me.262 pilots acted alone, at his own peril and risk. Note that the tactics of single aircraft in fighter units, which worked quite normally in the 51st bomber squadron, clearly interfered.

However, from tactical questions, let's return to our heroes. Steinhof's troika met a really noteworthy target not far from Stuttgart. They found a large compound "B-24" and "B-17". These were the planes of the American Eighth Air Force going to Regensburg. The first to attack the bombers was flying on the tip of the Steinhof wedge formed by the Me.262 troika. He swept past the escort aircraft like an arrow and, as he approached the bombers, he wanted to first open fire with rockets. However, the device did not work, the rockets did not leave the rails. It remained only to press the trigger for firing from the cannons. Steinhoff turned around and saw the engines of one of the Liberators enveloped in flames and black smoke. The Jagdverband 44 pilots following the wingman also enthusiastically crashed into the formation of four-engine bombers. Another bomber fell victim to the newcomer Farhmann, and then another B-17 sent Krupinski to the ground. In the same attack, Farhmann managed to knock out another B-17, he damaged his right engine. However, the desire to chalk up two heavy bombers at once almost became fatal for the Kachmarik of two eminent aces. First, the arrows of the bombers shot at him, and a minute later he was attacked by the escort fighters. Steinhof did not know about this. Coming out of the attack, he looked out for his wingman, but to no avail. Fuel spent in two battles forced him to return to Riem. Immediately after landing, he began to ask about his "kachmarik". But no one knew anything about him - only two "Me.262" landed - Steinhof and Krupinski.

What happened to Farhmann? When entering the attack, the arrows damaged his right wing so that the engine failed. Farchmann tried to escape with his damaged aircraft, but was spotted by four escort fighters. The Me.262, flying on one engine, became a "sitting duck", and American fighters bombarded the jet fighter with bullets from their 12.7-mm Brownings. They broke through the cockpit and smashed the dashboard. Farhmann realized that it was time to jump with a parachute. He landed in a small forest near the banks of the Danube. Even when he was hanging on the parachute lines, the pilot heard something big fall into the river - this was the end of his Me.262.

We see that the defense system of heavy bombers could withstand jet fighters. An attack from the rear hemisphere allowed the bomber gunners to stuff the Me.262 with heavy bullets, and the escort fighters could already finish off the wounded animal. The downed plane could not even properly cover the other planes of the same Ketten: when attacking a formation of bombers, jet fighters dispersed in order to disperse the attention of the shooters and prevent them from creating a dense wall of fire on some relatively narrow front. Due to the dispersal, the planes lost sight of each other even before the attack. Adolf Galland himself was able to evaluate the effectiveness of covering the Allied bombers when he attacked not even the B-17 and B-24, but the twin-engine B-26 Marauder. One of the escort fighters overtook him, shot down the Me.262 and wounded the pilot - Galland was wounded in the leg.

In a word, the effectiveness of "Me.262" as a means of protecting the Reich can be characterized as moderate. It was slightly higher than the piston aircraft - "Me.109", "FV-190" of the later series - but only increased the chances of escaping from cover fighters if it was possible not to get a burst from the B-17 or B-24 gunner. The Rurstal X-4 guided missiles could make the Me.262 a truly effective interceptor. They made it possible to attack the “box” of four-engine aircraft from the front hemisphere, without even entering the effective fire zone of the bomber gunners. But these missiles remained only in the form of prototypes, not a single attack with their help on the Me.262 was made.

The Attack That Wasn't

No one noticed a flight of a single reconnaissance aircraft at high altitude on the evening of June 6, 1944. "Me.262" with two cameras filmed the entire landing zone, and soon the plan of operation was ready.

“The approach to the target is at an altitude of 8 thousand meters,” the squadron commander said impassively. - Further, a gentle dive and a bomb drop at an altitude of no more than 2 thousand.

He was well aware that no detailed explanation was needed for the few experienced pilots chosen for such an important and dangerous mission. All of them had experience piloting twin-engine bombers, spent more than a thousand hours at the controls in the air.

At seven o'clock in the evening of the next day, six shadows with a hissing rumble rose into the air from the concrete of the airfield. The calmness in the air to the pilots was added by the feeling of almost complete invulnerability. They rushed at great speed above the clouds at a ringing height. Under the dashboard, the screen of a television sight glowed dimly. A camera controlled by a small lever was installed in the nose of the aircraft, which gave an excellent view down and forward. A guided bomb lay dormant under the belly of each of the jet bombers. When approaching the target, the planes began to dive down one after another, to where flashes of gaps flashed every now and then in the haze on a narrow light strip of the beach that separated the land from the bay of a thick blue color. Their goal was two snakes stretching from the shore, near which the fish-like outlines of transports were visible. Having caught a chain of metal structures in a television sight, the pilot dropped a bomb, which, leaving a whitish trail of a jet engine, rushed down. To control it, he had a handle - "joystick". Leaving engine control for a few seconds, the pilot directed the rocket at the target and then soared up again.

Of the five bombs, two hit the target, one in each of the snakes. The other three raised huge columns of silt and sand near the floating piers. Broken piers began to be demolished into the sea. The confused fighter pilots loitering in the air above the landing zone did not even have time to understand what had happened.

The next morning, nine jet bombers attacked the transports. With a low rumble they swept over the water, dropping bombs and flying a few meters over the masts of the transports. One of the unknown aircraft was shot down by a Tempest that successfully dived on it. The twin-engine plane rolled awkwardly and fell into the water. The pilot of the Tempest, in confusion, said on the radio to his less fortunate comrades: “He has no propellers ...” The next attack of strange aircraft was met with greater readiness and shot down three of the nine at once, catching them on the way out of the attack in climb. But the victims among the attackers were already small consolation. It was a disaster. The main mechanism for supplying the landing force caught on the strip of the coast was interrupted.

- This is the second Dieppe! - Canadian soldiers said with annoyance in the English bridgehead. They already had bad experience autumn 1942, when the British command launched a suicide attack on the coast occupied by the Germans "of little value" representatives of the Commonwealth from Canada.

They did not risk large forces of elite formations. Soon the bridgehead was to be attacked by large forces of German troops under the command of Erwin Rommel, well known to the British and Americans. Without a steady supply and air supremacy (reeled from the strikes of unknown aircraft), the opening of a second front in Europe could become a bloody meat grinder. Without noise and dust, retaining heavy weapons, the Allies evacuated back to England.

One way or something like this, events could have developed if Hitler's close associates and the leadership of Messerschmitt AG had listened more attentively to their Fuhrer. Adolf Hitler was an unstable, physically and mentally unhealthy man, but he cannot be denied the ability to feel the right course of action. Purposeful work on the Me.262 as a strike aircraft could bring more dividends than comforting a few dozen aces with a feeling of almost complete invulnerability in the cockpit of a jet fighter.

What were Speer and Galland hiding?

Complaints about the possessed Fuhrer in most of the memoirs of German generals and bigwigs of industry are a sign that some mistakes were made by the author of the memoirs. A. Galland in the spring of 1943 should have taken care not to knock out for himself and several mega-ass jet fighters, but to train 1000-2000 pilots for conventional piston aircraft. This would make it possible to compensate for the losses of the winter of 1944 and keep the air defense of the Reich at an acceptable level of combat capability. In turn, Speer had to provide these pilots with aircraft. In reality, both of them actually only reacted to the actions of the enemy instead of playing ahead of the curve. Events in late autumn 1943 and winter 1943–1944 forced the Germans to increase the production of conventional fighters, but the desired pace was reached too late. For most of 1943, the production of single- and twin-engine fighters in the Third Reich hovered around 1,000 per month. The maximum release was in July, 1263 aircraft. In November 1943, 985 fighters were produced, in December - only 687. Production somewhat revived at the beginning of 1944 - 1525 aircraft in January and 1104 in February (of which 825 Me.109 and 209 FV-190). A sharp increase in production occurred when a roasted rooster pecked and the Americans launched a massive air attack on Germany. In June 1944, the monthly production of fighters reached 2449 vehicles. In September 1944, only "Me.109" and "FV-190" in the version of fighters produced 1511 and 885 pieces, respectively. The total production of single-engine, twin-engine, day, night fighters in September 1944 amounted to 3078 (!) Aircraft. Let's not forget that this is the achievement of an industry bombarded with bombs. But by the fall of 1944, there was no longer any fuel or pilots for the released fighters. As the Russian proverb says - "A testicle is good for Christ's day." One and a half thousand piston "Messers" coming off the conveyors a month were relevant in the winter-spring of 1944, at the height of the air war over the Reich. Galland and Speer should have spent their energy building piston fighters and training pilots for them, and not relying on manna from heaven in the face of the Me.262 jet fighter.

* * *

Any authoritarian regime rests not so much on total control as on the psychological impact of possible repressive measures. All the power concentrated in the hands of Hitler did not mean his ability to pick up all the gloves of defiance thrown at him. He expected to raise only those whose appearance he had anticipated in advance. Hitler simply did not expect frank mass sabotage of his quite reasonable plans for Me.262. As a result of the fact that fighter aces dragged the Me.262 blanket over themselves, this aircraft, revolutionary in its capabilities, did not play a significant role either in the air war or in battles on the ground. Me.262, by definition, could not be produced in a large series, and the use was expedient in those areas where the effect is achieved due to the high flight qualities of a small number of aircraft. The preferred area of ​​application of the jet aircraft is reconnaissance, special operations as an attack aircraft (bridges, airfields) and the destruction of enemy reconnaissance aircraft in the air.